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Annual Public Performance Report

Year ending 30 June 2026 updated

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1. Executive Summary

About SA Power Networks

SA Power Networks distributes electricity to more than 950,000 homes and businesses across South Australia and is responsible for maintaining a safe, reliable and efficient supply of electricity. We also play a critical role in enabling customers to connect and export renewable energy to the grid from hundreds of thousands of consumer energy resources (CER), including rooftop solar, batteries and electric vehicles.

SA Power Networks manages the distribution network that supplies electricity from the high voltage transmission system to customers. Our infrastructure and assets include distribution substations, transformers, circuit breakers and switchgear, overhead powerlines, power poles including Stobie poles, and underground cables.

The network spans more than 178,000 km², with a total route length exceeding 95,000 km and an estimated replacement value of more than \$65 billion. This extensive infrastructure enables SA Power Networks to supply electricity to almost all parts of the state.

SA Power Networks provides a fully managed electricity distribution service, including:

- monitoring the network 24/7 to support safety and reliability;
- connecting new customers and supporting growing demand for load and export services;
- managing safety risks and addressing reliability and quality of supply issues;
- restoring power during outages and keeping customers informed; and
- complying with relevant Acts, regulations and service standards.

Customers and stakeholders

Our customers and stakeholders are diverse, geographically dispersed and evolving. SA Power Networks serves almost the entire population of South Australia and, as the state grows, so does the number of customers relying on the distribution network. Technological change is transforming the energy sector, and customer expectations are changing just as quickly.

Customers expect:

1. a safe and reliable electricity supply;
2. high-quality service;
3. support for the clean energy transition; and
4. affordable prices, with a focus on equity.

Customers also expect better information about outages and restoration times, as well as greater transparency around costs. SA Power Networks is committed to meeting these expectations while enabling customers to use the network in new ways, including as both consumers and exporters of electricity.

Public performance reporting

SA Power Networks is required by our electricity distribution licence to comply with the Essential Services Commission of South Australia's (ESCOSAs) Electricity Distribution Code (EDC). Clause 2.7.4 of the EDC requires us to report directly to the public on:

- a) our performance against service standards set out in clauses 2.1 to 2.4 of this industry code during the previous regulatory year
- b) our performance in the regions¹ defined by ESCOSAs Electricity Industry Guideline No. 1, and

¹ There are ten mainly geographic areas specified in Guideline No.1

- c) instances of non-compliance with service standards, the reason(s) for the non-compliance and an explanation of how the distributor intends to improve its performance so as to meet the service standards set out in clauses 2.1 to 2.4.

The following provides an overview of the performance of SA Power Networks in 2025/26 against the standards set out in the EDC clauses 2.1 to 2.4, which includes our reliability and customer service performance for the Year ending 30 June 2026 updated.

With respect to reliability and customer service performance, SA Power Networks:

- met all of its customer service targets established by the ESCOSA; and
- Met all “best endeavours” requirements for reliability (eg outage numbers, duration, feeder type, historical comparison).

SA Power Networks’ reliability performance varied across feeder categories during the reporting year. Overall interruption frequency performed favourably, while interruption duration was adversely affected by a higher incidence of prolonged outages.

Customer restoration performance was also impacted, with a greater proportion of customers experiencing extended restoration times than expected. These outcomes were influenced by the scale of weather-related outages, widespread insulator-pollution events and the challenges of locating faults on long rural feeders.

The most significant adverse outcomes were concentrated on Rural Long feeders. Widespread insulator-pollution-related flashovers during summer, together with extended fault-location times on long rural feeders, were material contributors. Weather-related interruptions were the largest contributor to annual interruption duration. While interruption duration associated with asset failures increased compared with the previous year, it remained broadly consistent with recent historical performance and was not the principal driver of the overall deterioration. The available evidence does not indicate a sustained decline in underlying equipment performance.

SA Power Networks considers that it used best endeavours to maintain reliability performance during 2025/26. While not all normalised reliability and customer restoration targets were achieved, the adverse outcomes were principally associated with severe weather-related events—including widespread insulator pollution on Rural Long feeders—rather than a sustained deterioration in underlying equipment performance.

In response, SA Power Networks implemented enhanced incident management and immediate operational interventions, supported by specialist engineering investigations. A substantial remediation program is planned for delivery in the coming year, including insulator replacement and silicone coating, feeder automation, SWER recloser upgrades and line fault indicators. These initiatives are intended to reduce future outages and improve fault location, isolation and restoration ahead of the next summer period.


1.1 2025/26 Performance summary

1.1.a Customer service standards

In 2025/26 SA Power Networks achieved both customer service standards:

- **91.5%** of telephone calls were answered within 30 seconds, exceeding the **85%** target.
- **99.7%** of enquiries were responded to within five business days, exceeding the **95%** target

Figure 1 shows SA Power Networks’ performance against these measures since 1 July 2005. Our performance in 2025/26 exceeded both applicable targets.

Figure 1: Customer service performance

1.1.b Reliability performance by feeder category

SA Power Networks achieved 8 of 16 normalised reliability targets across the four EDC feeder categories, where normalised measures exclude interruptions commencing on Major Event Days (MEDs).

Reliability is measured using:

- **USAIDIn** – average annual duration of unplanned customer interruptions;
- **USAIFIn** – average annual frequency of unplanned customer interruptions; and
- **CRoS_n** – percentage of customers experiencing interruptions exceeding specified durations.

While performance declined in some areas, SA Power Networks continued to employ best endeavours to maintain reliability performance over the period. Table 1 details our actual normalised performance for 2025/26 against the targets, for each of the four-feeder categories and overall.

Table 1: Feeder Category Normalised Reliability Performance

EDC Feeder Category	USAIDIn		USAIFIn	
	TARGET	2025/26	TARGET	2025/26
Central Business District (CBD)	15	8.9	0.15	0.08
Urban	110	109.6	1.15	0.93
Rural Short (RS)	200	181.7	1.65	1.29
Rural Long (RL)	290	371.3	1.75	1.87
Overall Distribution System ²	150	158.4	1.30	1.12

Overall normalised distribution-system performance varied across categories: USAIFIn of 1.12 interruptions per customer was below the implied overall target of 1.30, while USAIDIn of 158 minutes was above the implied overall target of 150 minutes. Performance was strongest in the CBD, Urban and Rural Short

² The ESCOSA reliability service standards do not include an overall distribution system target. These figures are the implied equivalent targets using the individual feeder category targets and the number of customers supplied from each feeder category.

categories. Rural Long feeder outcomes, and elevated interruption duration in some regional areas, were less favourable.

Table 2 identifies that customer restoration performances varied across feeder categories in 2025/26.

- **CBD feeders** outperformed both restoration-time targets, with 5.5% of customers restored after more than one hour and 1.9% after more than two hours.
- **Urban feeders** very slightly exceeded the two-hour target and did not meet the three-hour target.
- **Rural Short feeders** did not meet either restoration-time target, although results were close to the targets.
- **Rural Long feeders** did not meet either restoration-time target, with a material proportion of customers experiencing extended interruptions. This outcome was significantly affected by widespread weather-related and insulator-pollution events on long rural feeders.

Restoration performance deteriorated as feeder length and network remoteness increased. Extended restoration times were influenced by the scale of weather-related and insulator-pollution outages, as well as the time required to patrol and locate faults on long rural feeders. The reduced effectiveness of some SWER sectionalisers during periods of high solar PV penetration also contributed to restoration challenges. We commenced a program in 2026 to remediate these issues.

Table 2: Restoration of supply performance (CRoS_n)

EDC Feeder Category	Duration of Interruption (Hrs)	Target (%)	Actual (%)
CBD	≥ 1	11	5.5
	> 2	4	1.9
Urban	> 2	27	27.1
	> 3	11	13.5
Rural Short	> 3	27	29.6
	> 5	8	9.2
Rural Long	> 4	30	45.9
	> 7	10	14.1

1.1.c Network performance and best endeavours

SA Power Networks monitors three key indicators to assess whether the distribution system is being maintained cost-effectively and can reliably supply customers during normal operating conditions and MEDs:


- equipment-failure-related interruptions under normal conditions;
- weather-related interruptions under normal conditions; and
- equipment-failure-related interruptions during MEDs.

In 2025/26, overall normalised distribution-system performance was varied. USAIF_{in} achieved its implied overall target, while USAID_{in} was above the implied overall target. However, both measures remain favourable compared with much of the longer-term historical period, and the 2025/26 outcome does not indicate a sustained decline in overall network reliability.

As shown in Figure 2 below, weather-related interruptions were the largest contributor to USAID_{in} in 2025/26. This increase was principally associated with severe weather impacts and widespread insulator-pollution-related interruptions on Rural Long feeders during summer. These events were driven by prolonged dry conditions resulting in the deterioration of polymer insulators.

By comparison, equipment-failure-related USAIDIn remained within the recent historical range and below the target-setting-period average. The analysis also identifies no worsening trend in equipment-failure-related USAIDIn on Rural Long feeders. This indicates that the adverse 2025/26 outcome was not attributable to a systemic decline in underlying equipment reliability.

Figure 2: Maintaining the overall network performance





Four reliability measures exceeded their EDC reporting thresholds in 2025/26:

- Rural Short customer restoration performance for interruptions exceeding three hours;
- Rural Long USAIDIn;
- Rural Long customer restoration performance for interruptions exceeding four hours; and
- Rural Long customer restoration performance for interruptions exceeding seven hours.

The Rural Long outcomes were materially affected by weather-related insulator-pollution events and the operational challenges of locating, isolating and restoring faults across long, geographically dispersed rural feeders. The Rural Short restoration result was only marginally above its reporting threshold.

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that, despite annual variation, normalised distribution-system reliability has remained broadly stable over recent years. The 2025/26 USAIDIn outcome was above the target, reflecting elevated weather-related interruption duration, while USAIFIn remained below its implied target.

Figure 3: Distribution system USAIDIn and implied target**Figure 4: Distribution system USAIFIn and implied target**

SA Power Networks applied best endeavours in relation to its reliability obligations during 2025/26. This assessment is supported by the following observations:

- overall normalised reliability performance remains broadly stable over the longer term;
- equipment-failure-related interruption performance is stable, with no evidence of a sustained worsening trend;
- the adverse results were principally associated with weather-related interruptions and the identified insulator-pollution issue; and
- targeted operational and investment responses have been initiated to address the identified risks, including insulator washing, feeder automation, SWER recloser upgrades, line fault indicators, and a substantial program of insulator replacement and silicone coating.

Accordingly, while four reliability measures exceeded their reporting thresholds, the evidence indicates that these outcomes were driven principally by significant weather-related and emerging issues, rather than a

deterioration in general equipment condition or maintenance effectiveness. SA Power Networks has implemented, or commenced, targeted and cost-effective measures to address these issues and improve reliability and restoration outcomes ahead of the 2026/27 summer period.

1.1.d MED impacts

For the 2025/26 regulatory year, two MEDs were recorded, as summarised in Table 3.

Table 3: Major Event days 2025/26

Date(s)	USAIDI	Customers Affected	MED Category ³	Comment
29/08/2025	6.0	26,612	CAT1	Storm event affecting the greater Adelaide area
22/11/2025	10.1	20,475	CAT2	Storm event affecting Pt Pirie
Total	16.1			

SA Power Networks maintained its capability and responsiveness during these MEDs which were both driven by severe weather. The August 2025 metropolitan weather event and the November 2025 Port Pirie storm required major incident management arrangements, additional field and contractor resources, and coordination with emergency services. Weather-related damage was the primary driver of MED impacts.

1.1.e Network performance by region

SA Power Networks reports reliability across nine geographic regions and Major Regional Centres (MRCs). While performance varies between regions and years, the long-term results do not indicate a sustained decline in normalised reliability at a regional level.

Reliability is assessed using USAIDIn and USAIFIn, compared with each region's 15-year historical average. Key reliability risks include severe weather, vegetation, insulator pollution, and extended fault-location and restoration times on some rural networks. These risks are particularly relevant to areas supplied by long and geographically dispersed feeders.

In 2025/26, 14 of the 20 regional reliability measures—USAIDIn and USAIFIn for each of the 10 reporting areas—performed better than their respective 15-year historical averages. Six measures were above their historical averages, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Regional performance compared with the 15 year historical average

Region	CBD	GAMA	MRC	BMV	EH	EP	FP	RM	SE	UN
USAIDIn	9	112	92	358	269	537	269	257	325	262
USAIDIn 15yr Ave	21	111	130	212	295	513	274	223	267	448
USAIFIn	0.08	0.94	0.78	1.86	1.63	2.21	2.13	1.28	1.81	1.38
USAIFIn 15yr Ave	0.18	1.26	1.27	1.56	2.25	2.23	2.20	1.44	2.02	1.82

The measures above their historical averages were predominantly USAIDIn results, reflecting elevated interruption duration rather than interruption frequency. The most significant adverse outcome occurred in

³ SA Power Networks categorises the severity of MEDs based on the USAIDI contribution from interruptions that commence on that day, with the severity graded from the least, Cat1, to the most, Cat4.

the Barossa, Mid-North and Yorke Peninsula region, where summer insulator-pollution events materially affected Rural Long feeder performance in the Yorke Peninsula.

More broadly, elevated interruption duration was associated with weather-related outages, including vegetation impacts. On rural networks, restoration times were also affected by the reduced effectiveness of some SWER sectionalisers during periods of high solar PV generation, increasing the time required to locate and isolate faults. In the Greater Adelaide Metropolitan Area, weather-related vegetation impacts remain an ongoing reliability risk as the urban tree canopy expands.

1.1.f Information on GSL payments

SA Power Networks must make guaranteed service level (GSL) payments to customers when it does not meet the service levels specified in the EDC for:

- connection of new premises, and
- minimise the frequency and total annual duration of unplanned supply interruptions⁴,

where we do not meet the service level specified in the EDC. There are conditions and exceptions associated with each of these GSL payments.

Table 5: Number of GSL payments - Historic average and for year ending June 2026

GSL Payment numbers	Historic Ave.	Year ending 30 June 2026
Connection of new premises	154	307
Frequency of Interruptions	1,606	3,352
Long Duration interruptions	27,843	21,041

The higher number of GSL payments made associated with repair of streetlights in 2025/26 were associated with a backlog of streetlight repairs that occurred during a new contractor transition. One metropolitan contractor was underperforming and consequently had their contract terminated, with the remaining contractor taking over responsibility for the whole metropolitan region and the outstanding work.

1.1.g Information on reconnection of electricity supply after disconnection

SA Power Networks completes more than 100,000 retailer requested reconnections annually, with all reconnections in the Year ending 30 June 2026 updated, being completed in accordance with the EDC requirements.

⁴ Certain interruptions are excluded (eg momentary interruption, interruptions of the ElectraNet's transmission system).

2. Definitions

Definitions of terms used in this report:

Term	Definition
2.5β method	The IEEE Std 1366™-2012 2.5 Beta statistical method used to calculate T _{MED} .
ABA	Adelaide Business Area – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1 (same as the CBD).
AER	Australian Energy Regulator
BMV	Barossa, Mid-North & Yorke Peninsula– geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1.
CBD feeder	a feeder supplying predominantly commercial, high-rise buildings, supplied by a predominantly underground distribution network containing significant interconnection and redundancy when compared to urban areas.
CRoS	Customer restoration of supply – percentage of total customers who have an interruption exceeding a specific number of hours.
CRoS_n	Normalised CRoS (excluding interruptions that commence on MEDs)
EDC	South Australian Electricity Distribution Code version v13.1 unless otherwise stated.
EH	Eastern Hills – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1.
EP	Eyre Peninsula – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1.
ESCOSA	Essential Services Commission of South Australia
FP	Fleurieu Peninsula – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1.
Feeder	means a high voltage electric powerline and associated equipment which the distributor uses to distribute electricity
GAMA	Greater Adelaide Metropolitan Area – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1.
IEEE	US Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Inc
SWE	Significant Weather Event – a significant weather event where the contribution to USAIDI _n from weather related caused interruptions has a material contribution to USAIDI of the distribution system, feeder category or a region.
Long Rural feeder	a feeder which is not a CBD or urban feeder with a total feeder route length greater than 200 km, or otherwise as agreed by SA Power Networks and ESCOSA.
MED	Major Event Day – any day where the daily USAIDI accrued on that day, exceeds a predetermined USAIDI threshold. The threshold is determined in accordance with the IEEE Std 1366™-2012 2.5 Beta statistical method.
MRC	Major Regional Centres – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1 (agreed high voltage feeders in Urban centres and Localities with a population of 10,000 or more at the 2016 census, except Adelaide and Gawler)
RCP	Regulatory Control Period means the period covered by a regulatory distribution determination by the AER.
RM	Riverland & Murrayland – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1
RT	Reporting threshold as defined in the EDC Section 2.2.1
SE	Southeast – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA’s Guideline No.1.
Short Rural feeder	a feeder which is not a CBD or urban feeder with a total feeder route length less than 200 km, or otherwise as agreed by SA Power Networks and ESCOSA.

STPIS	The AER's Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme with provides incentive for distributors to maintain or improve reliability performance.
T_{MED}	The daily USAIDI threshold used to determine if a day will be classified as a MED.
TSP	Target Setting Period is the ten-year period ending 30 June 2019 used to establish the feeder category reliability service standard targets.
UCAIDI	Unplanned Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (ie average time taken to restore supply to customers as a result of an unplanned interruption)
UN	Upper North – geographic area/region as defined in ESCOSA's Guideline No.1.
Urban feeder	a feeder, which is not a CBD feeder, with actual maximum demand over the reporting period per total feeder route length greater than 0.3 MVA/km, or otherwise as agreed by SA Power Networks and ESCOSA.
USAIDI	Unplanned System Average Interruption Duration Index – total number of minutes, on average, that a customer is without electricity because of unplanned interruptions ⁵ in a year.
USAIFI	Unplanned System Average Interruption Frequency Index – average number of times a customer's supply is interrupted per year from unplanned interruptions
USAIDIn	Normalised USAIDI (USAIDI excluding interruptions that commence on MEDs)
USAIFIn	Normalised USAIFI (USAIFI excluding interruptions that commence on MEDs)

⁵ Excludes interruptions where the duration is three minutes or less.

3. SA Power Networks' service standards for the 2025-30 regulatory control period

3.1 Introduction

SA Power Networks is required under its distribution licence to comply with the service standards set out in the EDC.

The EDC requires us to use best endeavours to achieve the applicable service standard targets for each year ending 30 June. Clause 1.5.1 of the EDC defines *best endeavours* as acting in good faith and applying all reasonable efforts, skill and resources.

As the obligation is to use best endeavours, SA Power Networks may still comply with a service standard even where the relevant target is not achieved, provided we can demonstrate that we have used best endeavours.

The following sections summarise the four categories of service standards and the relevant targets, where specified, for the 2025–30 Regulatory Period.

3.2 Customer service measures and targets

3.2.a Customer service measures

There are two customer service standards defined in the EDC relating to communication with our customers:

- Time to respond to telephone calls; and
- Time to respond to written enquiries.

These standards measure how quickly we respond to customer enquiries by both telephone and written responses.

3.2.b Customer service targets

SA Power Networks is required to use best endeavours to meet the following customer service standards for each year ending 30 June.

Table 6: EDC customer service measures and targets

Category	Customer service to measure	Target
Customer service	Time to response to telephone calls	85% within 30 seconds
Customer service	Time to respond to written enquiries	95% within 5 business days after receipt of the written enquiry

Achieving the telephone response target means that for every 100 telephone calls received we must on average answer 85 or more calls within 30 seconds. This response rate applies in aggregate to five specified telephone numbers including the Faults and Emergencies number. The EDC defines what is deemed to be an answered telephone call.

Likewise, achieving the written response target means that for every 100 written enquiries we receive (includes email and Facebook enquiries) we must respond to 95 or more of those within five business days.

For the year ending June 2026, SA Power Networks achieved all its customer service targets established by the ESCoSA.

3.3 Measuring distribution system performance

3.3.a Reliability measures

Electricity distribution systems are highly reliable. As a result, reliability is generally measured by the average number of minutes customers are without electricity supply each year.

For example, a system with 180 minutes of interruptions in a year remains available for 525,420 minutes, equating to supply availability of approximately 99.97%.

The ESCOSA and the AER use the following measures to assess distributor reliability:

- **USAIDIn** (Unplanned System Average Interruption Duration Index, normalised) — the average duration, in minutes, that a customer is without supply during the reporting period, generally a year. It excludes interruptions commencing on MEDs⁶.
- **USAIFIn** (Unplanned System Average Interruption Frequency Index, normalised) — the average number of unplanned interruptions experienced by a customer during the reporting period. It also excludes interruptions commencing on MEDs.
- **CRoS** (Customer Restoration of Supply) — ESCOSA applies two CRoS targets for each feeder category. These measure the percentage of customers experiencing an unplanned interruption longer than a specified duration.

Reliability measures are normalised because MEDs can cause substantial year-to-year variation and obscure underlying network performance trends. For example, total system USAIDI was 481 minutes in 2016/17, when nine MEDs occurred, compared with 16 minutes in 2025/26, when two MEDs occurred. MEDs are generally caused by severe weather events and are the main driver of annual reliability variability.

Excluding MEDs allows regulators to assess whether the network is being maintained to manage normal weather conditions and other outage causes, such as animal contact. However, MED performance is also monitored to confirm that distributors can respond effectively and restore supply within reasonable timeframes following major events.

Because MEDs vary significantly in scale, severity and impacts, it is not practical to establish standard performance targets for them. A single MED can contribute from approximately 6 to 160 USAIDI minutes. Section 4.4 provides further details on MED categorisation and performance assessment.

3.3.b Feeder categories

The EDC specifies reliability standards applying to each of the following four feeder categories:

- **Central Business District (CBD) feeder** – means a high voltage overhead powerline or underground cable in the CBD area supplying predominantly commercial, high-rise buildings, supplied by a predominantly underground distribution network containing significant interconnection between high voltage feeders;
- **Urban feeder** – means a high voltage overhead powerline or underground cable, which is not a CBD feeder, where the average⁷ maximum demand divided by average feeder route length is greater than 0.3 MVA/km;

⁶ A MED is a day where the total USAIDI contribution from interruptions that commence on that day exceed a predetermined total distribution system USAIDI threshold value (Tmed). The value of Tmed is determined using a statistical process for each year based on the prior 5 years daily distribution system USAIDI data. Since 1 July 2005 there are on average about 3 MEDs pa.

⁷ The average maximum demand and average route length of the feeder is over the last three consecutive years, including the current reporting year.

- Rural Short (RS) – means a high voltage overhead powerline or underground cable which is not a CBD feeder or urban feeder with a total feeder route length less than 200 km; and
- Rural Long (RL) feeder – means a high voltage overhead powerline or underground cable which is not a CBD feeder, urban feeder or a rural short feeder.

The table below contains information about each feeder category.

Table 7: Feeder category statistics

Feeder	CBD	Urban	Rural Short	Rural Long
Areas supplied	Part of the Adelaide square mile.	Greater Adelaide Metro Area and some parts of large regional towns	Eastern Hills (50%), Fleurieu Peninsula, Riverland and parts of large and medium regional towns.	Barossa, Eastern Hills (50%), Most of Eyre Peninsula, KI, Mid-North, Murraylands, Southeast, Upper North
% of customers	1.0%	69%	15%	15%
Circuit length of powerline (km)	300	26,000	13,700	49,300
Annual Consumption (GWh)	500	6,800	1,300	1,300

3.3.c Establishment of the reliability of supply targets

The ESCOSA in its process to establish the reliability of supply standards for the 2025-330 RCP confirmed most customers were satisfied with their current electricity supply reliability and were unwilling to pay for improvements. Therefore, ESCOSA decided that the reliability service standard targets should reflect the average historic reliability performance of the four feeder categories established for the 2020-25 RCP. The ten-year period (ie 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2019) was applied to determine the historic average performance.

There is large annual variation in the reliability performance for each feeder category, often related to the severity of weather events in a year. For example, the Rural Short feeder category USAIDIn has varied from a best of 143 minutes (2014/15) to a worst of 283 minutes (2009/10). Therefore, the reliability service standard includes a reporting threshold, which represents the normally expected variation in reliability for a feeder category. SA Power Networks must demonstrate the use of best endeavours where the reliability of a feeder category is worse than the reporting threshold. The reporting threshold has been established at a level that, with normal variation in reliability, it should typically require SA Power Networks to demonstrate the use of best endeavours once every five years.

3.3.d Jurisdictional reliability service standards

SA Power Networks is required, under clause 2.2.1 of the South Australian EDC, to use ‘best endeavours’⁸ to achieve the reliability targets set out in Table 8 and Table 9, for each year ending 30 June during the 2025-30 Regulatory Control Period, which runs from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2030.

SA Power Networks must report on how it has applied its best endeavours where its performance is worse than the reporting thresholds set out in Table 8 and Table 10.

⁸ Under the EDC, “best endeavours” means “to act in good faith and use all reasonable efforts, skill and resources”.

Table 8: Feeder category reliability service standards

Measure		CBD Feeders	Urban Feeders	Rural Short Feeders	Rural Long Feeders
USAIDIn (average minutes off supply per customer per annum)	Target:	15	110	200	290
	Reporting threshold:	20	125	220	330
USAIFIn (average number of supply interruptions per customer per annum)	Target:	0.15	1.15	1.65	1.75
	Reporting threshold:	0.20	1.35	1.85	2.10

Table 9: Feeder category customer restoration of supply standards

Target (%)	Single interruption duration	CBD Feeders	Urban Feeders	Rural Short Feeders	Rural Long Feeders
Percentage of total customers in each feeder category per annum	Interruption equal to or greater than 1 hour	11			
	Interruption longer than 2 hours	4	27		
	Interruption longer than 3 hours		11	27	
	Interruption longer than 4 hours				30
	Interruption longer than 5 hours			8	
	Interruption longer than 7 hours				10

Table 10: Feeder category customer restoration of supply reporting thresholds

Reporting Threshold	Interruption duration	CBD Feeders	Urban Feeders	Rural Short Feeders	Rural Long Feeders
Percentage of total customers in each feeder category per annum	Interruption equal to or greater than 1 hour	13.5			
	Interruption longer than 2 hours	6.5	29.5		
	Interruption longer than 3 hours		13.5	29.5	
	Interruption longer than 4 hours				32.5
	Interruption longer than 5 hours			10.5	
	Interruption longer than 7 hours				12.5

Note: These standards reflect unplanned supply interruptions on the low voltage and high voltage distribution network but exclude:

- a) Any planned supply interruptions and unplanned supply interruptions with a duration no more than three minutes; and
- b) Any unplanned supply interruption that starts on a day which qualifies as a MED.

The EDC feeder-category reliability targets were established using average performance over the ten-year period ending 30 June 2019, referred to as the target-setting period (TSP). These averages were rounded to the nearest five minutes for USAIDI and to the nearest 0.05 interruptions for USAIFI; consequently, some targets were rounded down and others up.

As the targets are based on average performance, there is no expectation⁹ that every target will be achieved in every year. During the TSP, the number of targets in Table 8 and Table 9 achieved each year ranged from 4 to 16, with an annual average of 9.

ESCOSA recognises the importance of maintaining reliable electricity supply across regional South Australia. To support transparent oversight of regional reliability outcomes, ESCOSA requires SA Power Networks to report reliability performance across ten regions. This enables ongoing monitoring of longer-term performance trends and helps identify opportunities to maintain or improve reliability. See Section 8 for each region's performance.

⁹ SA Power Networks receives funding to maintain average historical reliability performance, rather than to achieve every EDC reliability target each year.

3.4 Guaranteed service level payments

3.4.a Introduction

SA Power Networks is required to make GSL payments where we do not:

- connect a new supply address on the date agreed or within six business days of the customer meeting all the necessary preconditions; and
- minimise the frequency (number) and the total duration of unplanned supply interruptions for the year ending 30 June.

3.4.b Connecting a new supply address

SA Power Networks is required to connect a new supply address on the date agreed or if no date is agreed within six business days, provided the customer has met all necessary pre-conditions for connection. Where this is not achieved, we will pay the customer \$65 dollars per business day that we are late to a maximum of \$325.

This GSL payment only applies in situations where electricity supply is available adjacent to the property and all that is required to connect the premises is to install a service or make the connection between the distribution network and the customers electrical installation. It does not include the installation of the electricity meter which is now the responsibility of retailers.

3.4.c Reliability GSL payments

SA Power Networks must use best endeavours to minimise the frequency and duration of supply interruptions at a customer's supply address.

Where the total number of interruptions and/or the total duration of interruptions during a regulatory year exceeds the applicable thresholds, we must make reliability GSL payments to affected customers, in accordance with the following tables.

Table 11: Thresholds and payment amount for frequency of interruptions

	Threshold
Number of unplanned interruptions in a regulatory year	>9
Payment (GST inclusive)	\$100

Table 12: Thresholds and payment amounts for total annual duration of interruptions

	Threshold 1	Threshold 2	Threshold 3
Total annual duration (hrs) of unplanned interruptions	> 20 and ≤30	> 30 and ≤60	> 60
Payment (GST inclusive)	\$100	\$150	\$300

Customers' electricity accounts will be credited with their eligible reliability GSL payments in the quarter following the end of the regulatory year (ie typically in August each year). Payments will be made in respect of the supply address, not the customer. The resident of the supply address will receive a SMS or letter advising them of the reliability GSL credit that has been applied to their electricity account.

The above scheme excludes:

- (i) interruptions caused by the following:

- (A) transmission and generation failures
- (B) disconnection required in an emergency situation (e.g. bushfire)
- (C) single customer faults caused by that customer
- (ii) momentary interruptions (ie interruptions where the duration is three minutes or less)
- (iii) planned interruptions, and
- (iv) partial interruptions to a supply address such as:
 - (A) interruptions that affect only one or two phases of supply at a supply address with three phase supply, and/or
 - (B) interruptions to one connection point where the supply address has multiple connection points.

3.5 Reconnection after disconnection

In summary, where the National Energy Retail Rules (NERR) require SA Power Networks to reconnect a previously disconnected customer's premises, we must:

- reconnect on the same business day in the Adelaide Business Area and the Major Metropolitan areas, provided the request is received by us prior to 5pm on the business day; and
- use best endeavours to reconnect on the same business day in other areas and in any event on the next business day, where the request is received after 5pm.

The EDC clause 2.4 details all the possible scenarios for a customer requesting reconnection and the timeframes required for reconnection or whether a customer payment is required to achieve those timeframes.

Under the deemed standard connection contract, under which reconnections are performed, the obligation to reconnect lapses if the customer does not request a reconnection within 10 business days of their disconnection. Therefore, the reconnection timeframes only apply if a customer has requested a reconnection of their premises within 10 business days of the disconnection.

Under the AER and National Energy Retail Law (NERL) compliance framework, SA Power Networks is required to report quarterly any failures with our reconnection obligations to the AER. SA Power Networks reconnected all customers within the specified timeframe in 2025/26.

3.6 The Australian Energy Regulator's Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme

The AER is required by the National Electricity Rules (NER) to develop a scheme that provides incentives for distributors, like SA Power Networks, to maintain or improve customer service including supply reliability. The AER scheme is the Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme (STPIS) which is detailed in the AER STPIS Guideline¹⁰.

Under the reliability component of the STPIS, the AER establishes feeder category USAIDIn and USAIFIn targets for each regulatory period, with those targets detailed in its final distribution determination every five years. Under the STPIS regime the distributor is then annually rewarded or penalised based on the variation from those targets for each year. A positive variation is rewarded, and a negative variation penalised.

¹⁰ The AER's STPIS Guideline is at <https://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/AER%20-%20Service%20Target%20Performance%20Incentive%20Scheme%20v%202.0%20-%2014%20November%202018%20%28updated%2013%20December%202018%29.pdf>

The STPIS targets are different to EDC feeder category targets as the targets for 2025-30 were based on a 5-year average actual performance from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2024. These targets were then adjusted for proposed reliability improvement projects planned to be delivered over the period.

Table 13 details the adjusted STPIS feeder category reliability targets that apply to each year of the 2025-30 period.

Table 13: STPIS Reliability targets (year ending 30 June) for 2020-25 and the new targets for 2025-30

Feeder Category	2020-25		2025-30	
	USAIDIn	USAIFIn	USAIDIn	USAIFIn
CBD Feeders	22.5	0.185	20.3	0.179
Urban Feeders	105.1	1.057	95.1	0.871
Rural Short Feeders	181.9	1.427	168.5	1.159
Rural Long Feeders	277.9	1.526	285.7	1.434

With the exception of Rural Long USAIDIn, the STPIS targets for 2025-30 are much harder to achieve compared to the 2020-25 targets.

Our 2025/26 reliability performance will result in a material STPIS penalty and contribute to lower allowed revenue and distribution tariffs in 2027/28 and 2028/29.

4. Assessment of Reliability Performance

4.1 Introduction

As outlined in Section 3, SA Power Networks is required to use best endeavours to achieve the EDC normalised reliability targets for each feeder category in each year ending 30 June. Accordingly, performance may be worse than an applicable target without necessarily constituting non-compliance, provided SA Power Networks can demonstrate that it has used best endeavours to achieve the target.

The EDC defines *best endeavours* as:

“best endeavours” means to act in good faith and use all reasonable efforts, skill and resources.

SA Power Networks is funded to maintain long-term historical reliability performance, rather than to achieve every reliability target in every individual year. ESCOSA will assess if SA Power Networks has met its best endeavours obligations.

In practical terms, SA Power Networks’ obligation is to maintain historical average reliability over the long term. Year-to-year variation is expected; however, reliability performance should not show a sustained deterioration in any feeder category. For this purpose, a worsening trend is identified where a reliability measure exceeds its reporting threshold in two consecutive years.

MEDs are excluded from reliability service-standard targets to reduce year-to-year variability in reported performance. Annual reliability outcomes are influenced by:

1. normalised performance—that is, performance excluding MEDs;
2. the number of MEDs, which has ranged from zero to nine per year; and
3. the severity of individual MEDs, which has ranged from 6.0 to 161.3 USAIDI minutes.

This section assesses the key drivers of variation in normalised reliability performance, together with the impacts of MEDs on customer reliability outcomes.

4.2 Reliability of the distribution network

The normalised reliability performance of the distribution network is dependent on:

- The proportion of the network that is overhead, because underground cables are not typically affected by weather;
- How the system is designed and constructed (e.g. meshed or radial network);
- How the system is being maintained (e.g. performance would decline in the long term if the network was not being appropriately maintained);
- Trees¹¹, vegetation debris or other objects impacting powerlines from outside the regulated ‘clearance zones’;
- The interruptions/failures of the network that result from local severe weather events (SWEs). These events have a material¹² USAIDI impact (i.e. excluding MEDs) and are the result of many weather (e.g. lightning) caused interruptions on a single day; and
- How well a distributor responds to interruptions during MEDs, especially in terms of the time taken to restore customers’ electricity supply.

¹¹ SA Power Networks is limited by the Electricity Act on the extent that it can clear vegetation from around powerlines.

SA Power Networks must clear vegetation from around a powerline so it must not grow or bend into the clearance zone.

¹² Material impact in this context means the USAIDI attributed to the day exceeds 3% of the average annual historic performance (ie about 10 times an average day’s contribution).

SA Power Networks has varying degrees of control over these individual factors. Any assessment of the use of best endeavours should only consider those factors that SA Power Networks can reasonably control/affect.

4.3 Major causes of annual variations in reliability

4.3.a Introduction

SA Power Networks is obligated to use best endeavours to meet average historic levels of normalised (i.e. excludes MEDs) reliability. The determination of best endeavours from analysing the reliability measures is difficult, considering the significant variations in reliability from one year to the next, despite the exclusion of MEDs.

The main causes of significant annual variations in unplanned reliability levels, in order of greatest to least, are:

- Weather (includes unknown¹³);
- Equipment failure; and
- Other (includes operational, third party (e.g. vandalism, car hit pole, grey-headed flying foxes) and other causes).

4.3.b Weather-caused interruptions

Weather-caused interruptions during the TSP have varied in their contribution to USAIDIn (i.e. normalised reliability which excludes MEDs) from a low of 63 minutes in 2017-18 to a high of 95 minutes in 2009-10, and an average of 79 minutes. The contribution to USAIDIn in 2025/26 from weather caused interruptions was 86 minutes.

Figure 5 (below) shows an overall declining (improving) contribution to USAIDIn from weather caused interruption. This improvement has resulted from SA Power Networks long term reliability improvement initiatives. However, since 2019/20 there has been an incline (worsening) in weather related interruptions impacting the performance of our rural feeders.

4.3.c Equipment failure caused interruptions

The contribution of equipment failure-caused interruptions to USAIDIn during the TSP has varied from a low of 45 minutes in 2017-18 and 2018-19, to a high of 59 minutes in 2010-11, with an average of 50 minutes. The contribution to USAIDIn in 2025/26 from equipment failure caused interruptions was 52 minutes.

Figure 5 (below) shows a stable contribution to USAIDIn from equipment failure caused interruptions. This stability demonstrates that SA Power Networks has been appropriately maintaining the distribution system.

Figure 5 also shows some correlation in the variations in the contribution to normalised USAIDI from weather caused and equipment caused interruptions.

4.3.d Other-caused interruptions


Other-caused interruptions contribution to USAIDIn during the 10-year target setting period varied from a minimum of 19 minutes in 2015-16 to a high of 27 minutes in 2009-10, and an average of 22 minutes. The contribution to USAIDIn in 2025/26 from other-caused interruptions was 22 minutes

Figure 5 below highlights that the contribution to USAIDIn from interruptions by 'other' causes (e.g. due to third parties) has been relatively stable at around 20 minutes since 2010-11. Since 2020/21 there has been

¹³ There is a reasonably strong correlation between weather and unknown causes, so these are grouped together to simplify the analysis.

a fluctuation in USAIDIn compared to the historic average, this is due to the number of interruptions caused by the increase in the grey-headed flying fox (fruit bats) population, which mainly affects Urban Feeders. We are currently trialling different methods to mitigate the number of interruptions caused by fruit bats¹⁴ on Urban feeders. However, the geographic extent of the fruit bat impacts is increasing with four colonies now established in Rural areas.

Figure 5: Annual USAIDIn contribution from interruptions caused by weather, equipment failure and other.



4.3.e Conclusion

The trend in asset failures remains stable indicating our asset management practices are effective and we are appropriately maintaining and operating the distribution system. However, in recent years we have experienced an increase in weather related supply interruptions which has resulted in a failure to meet the some rural short and all of the rural long targets.

4.4 Categorisation of MEDs

4.4.a Introduction

The overall annual contribution to USAIDI, at the distribution system aggregate level, from interruptions on MEDs has varied from nil to 329 minutes over the 15-year period to 30 June 2020. The significant variation is due to the:

- annual number of MEDs varying from nil to nine; and
- severity (using USAIDI as a proxy) of a single MED varying from 6.0 to 192.8 USAIDI minutes.

As highlighted previously, although excluded from the EDC reliability service standards, it is important that our performance on MEDs is still monitored. This section details how MEDs are classified and how SA Power Networks categorises them to enable comparison of our performance on similar severity MEDs.

4.4.b MED classification

A MED is determined using the US Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Inc (IEEE) Std 1366™-2012 2.5 Beta Method (2.5β Method). The 2.5β Method pre-determines a MED USAIDI threshold (T_{MED}) that applies for a reporting period (i.e. a year). Any day where USAIDI exceeds the threshold is classified as a

¹⁴ Fruit bats first migrated and established a colony (near the Adelaide Botanic Gardens) in South Australia in 2012.

MED. (See Appendix A for further details). In determining the daily USAIDI, any interruptions that commence between midnight and midnight on that day are accrued to that day.

4.4.c Factors affecting restoration of customers' electricity supply on MEDs

The other component of ESCOSA's 2025–30 reliability framework is the monitoring of MED performance. The primary measure of SA Power Networks' MED performance is the average time taken to restore electricity supply to affected customers. Restoration times during MEDs are influenced by several factors, including:

- the number of interruptions and customers affected;
- the location of faults and damage—for example, metropolitan and rural events require different travel, patrol and repair times;
- the extent and type of infrastructure damage. For example, a damaged insulator may be repaired by a field crew using an elevated work platform, whereas replacement of a failed Stobie pole may require a replacement pole, field crew, elevated work platform and crane, resulting in a longer restoration time;
- the availability and deployment of appropriately skilled crews and specialist equipment;
- the duration and timing of the severe weather event. Crews are subject to fatigue-management requirements and cannot work more than 16 hours in a 24-hour period. Events commencing before a MED may therefore affect available restoration resources; and
- the accuracy and lead time of weather forecasts. Where severe weather is not forecast, there is less opportunity to pre-position crews, contractors, equipment and other resources before the event.

4.4.d Categorisation of MEDs

These factors make the determination of whether SA Power Networks' response during MEDs has declined or not complex. SA Power Networks considers it essential to compare each MED with similar historic MEDs to determine if the restoration of supply times have declined or not. This categorisation is important in assessing the MED performance, with the distribution system experiencing more intense MEDs since 1 July 2010¹⁵. SA Power Networks has ranked the intensity of the MEDs, albeit with limited data for some MED categories, into the following four categories which are:

- Category 1 (Cat 1) MED where the maximum daily USAIDI is less than nine minutes¹⁶;
- Category 2 (Cat 2) MED where the maximum daily USAIDI is more than nine minutes and no more than 23 minutes¹⁷;
- Category 3 (Cat 3) MED where the maximum daily USAIDI is more than 23 minutes and no more than 55 minutes; and
- Category 4 (Cat 4) MED where the maximum daily USAIDI exceeds 55¹⁸ minutes.

SA Power Networks may assign MEDs to a higher or lower category based on other factors like:

¹⁵ The BoM has advised SA Power Networks that it is likely that the number and intensity of SWEs will increase due to the effects of climate change.

¹⁶ Note some MEDs that would classify as a Cat 1 due to its USAIDI value (<9 minutes), are classified as Cat 2 as they mainly affected rural areas, and as such the response times are longer. More than half the MEDs fall into this category.

¹⁷ The 23-minute threshold was based of the IEEE Std 1366 2.5β methodology for determining MED but used a 3.5 multiplier for Beta.

¹⁸ The 55 minute threshold uses the IEEE's 1366 2.5β methodology but with a 4.15 multiplier for Beta which is referred to in the IEEE's standard as a Catastrophic Event Day (CED). There has been one Cat4 MED, on 4 Feb 2014.

- Extent of the damage to infrastructure (e.g. many pole failures versus just insulator failures);
- Locations of the interruptions to electricity supply (e.g. rural versus urban areas);
- Significant weather event lasts more than 24 hours; and
- Access to our infrastructure (e.g. preventing from accessing our infrastructure due to a bushfire, vehicle access is restricted due to saturated ground conditions).

5. Reliability assessment framework and use of Best Endeavours

As outlined in Section 4, SA Power Networks is required to employ best endeavours to achieve the EDC's feeder category reliability targets for each year ending 30 June. Despite the exclusion of interruptions commencing on MEDs, ESCOSA must assess whether SA Power Networks has complied with its reliability service standards, in that it has used best endeavours where the performance is worse than the target.

The exclusion of interruptions commencing on MEDs removes the extreme variations in annual reliability performance but there can still be significant variations (e.g. up to 50% of the reliability target) in feeder category reliability measures. These variations are normally related to local or state-wide SWEs that do not breach the MED USAIDI threshold.

5.1 Introduction

Each year during 2025-30, ESCOSA will determine whether SA Power Networks has:

- used best endeavours to meet the normalised reliability targets;
- maintained its responsiveness to restore customers' electricity supply as soon as practical, for those customers that experience an outage on MEDs; and
- maintained the historic reliability levels for those customers in the 10 regions.

How each of these components should be determined and assessed is detailed below.

5.2 Normalised reliability

5.2.a Introduction

In determining whether best endeavours have been used to achieve the EDC reliability targets it is first necessary to consider normalised reliability (i.e. excluding MEDs) and determine if:

- Reliability levels are stable for the aggregate distribution system and an individual feeder category basis (i.e. there has been no worsening trend in performance over several years);
 - the distribution system is being appropriately maintained if there has been no declining trend in the following measures:
 - USAIDIn resulting from 'equipment failure' caused interruptions; and
 - USAIDIn resulting from weather caused interruptions; and
- any remaining significant deviations in performance are the result of local or state-wide SWEs that do not result in a MED and/or 'one-off' type events or causes.

5.2.b Normalised reliability analysis

The first step in analysing normalised reliability is to examine the performance trend over several years, as large annual variations generally result from either local SWEs or one-off events. Longer term trend performance is analysed as it may take many years before any degradation of the network can be identified from its reliability performance.

Individual feeder categories for the 10 regions can have significant variations in normalised reliability as the normalisation process is less effective at sub-system levels of the distribution system as previously explained.

A stable non-declining trend in USAIDIn, provides a good indication that SA Power Networks has used best endeavours to meet EDC reliability targets and to maintain historic regional reliability, provided any material excursions are due to weather events or one-off non-systemic events.

5.2.c Design, construction and maintenance of the network

The next step in analysing whether best endeavours have been used is to analyse the trend performance in the overall average daily USAIDIn contribution from weather caused interruptions. This measure provides an indication that:

- The distribution system is being maintained to cope with ‘normal’ SWEs (i.e. non-MED SWEs); and
- new additions to the network are appropriately designed and constructed to withstand normal weather variations.

Another indicator of whether SA Power Networks is adequately maintaining all parts of the network is to analyse the trend performance in USAIDIn that is attributed to equipment failure. A stable non-declining trend in USAIDIn from equipment failure caused interruptions indicates that SA Power Networks is appropriately maintaining the network to achieve the EDC reliability targets.

5.2.d Normalised reliability conclusion

SA Power Networks considers that the use of best endeavours is demonstrated by a stable non-declining trend performance in:

- USAIDIn and USAIFIn at the aggregate distribution system and feeder category level;
- Annual contribution USAIDIn from weather caused interruptions is not increasing; and
- USAIDIn contribution from equipment failure-caused interruptions is also not increasing.

5.3 MED Performance

5.3.a Introduction

Section 4.4 above detailed the factors that impact MED reliability performance. The main factor contributing to a higher-than-average Unplanned Customer Average Interruption Duration Index¹⁹ (**UCAIDI**) during a MED is the extent of infrastructure damage and any delays in gaining safe access to carry out repairs. For example, during bushfire conditions, restoration may be delayed by the time required to patrol affected areas, access fire grounds, complete repairs, and ensure premises can be safely reconnected or, where necessary, disconnected before supply is restored.

5.3.b Measures

SA Power Networks assesses whether it has used best endeavours during MEDs by analysing:

- **MEDs by category**²⁰ (that is, Cat 1, 2, 3 or 4, as defined in Section 4.4 above);
- **the contribution of equipment failure to MED USAIDI**, which indicates whether the distribution network is being appropriately maintained to withstand MEDs or major SWEs; and
- **individual MED UCAIDI by MED category**. This serves as a proxy for the effectiveness of SA Power Networks’ processes and practices in responding to major SWEs. UCAIDI would generally be expected to increase as event severity rises from Cat 2 to Cat 4, particularly where the MED involves extensive infrastructure damage or access constraints, such as flooding that prevents repair crews from reaching affected sites.

¹⁹ UCAIDI is a measure of the average time, in minutes, that customers who experience an interruption are without supply.

²⁰ A Cat 1 MED would normally occur every year, Cat 2 every few years and Cat 3 or Cat 4 once every 5 years or more.

5.3.c MED reliability conclusion

SA Power Networks considers that its use of best endeavours during MEDs can be demonstrated by achieving reasonable average supply restoration times, as set out below:

- Cat1 UCAIDI — typically 180 minutes with expected range between 150 and 210 minutes;
- Cat2 UCAIDI — typically 330 minutes with expected range between 230 and 500 minutes;
- Cat3 UCAIDI — typically 290 minutes with expected range between 210 and 430 minutes; and
- Cat4 UCAIDI — typically 600 minutes but expected to be greater than 500 minutes and is associated with extensive infrastructure damage; and

demonstrating no decline in trend performance in the proportion of USAIDI attributed to equipment failure.

Cat 1 UCAIDI is the most reliable indicator of whether SA Power Networks has maintained its capability to respond appropriately to MEDs, as Cat 1 MEDs account for at least half of all MEDs, show the least variation in USAIDI, and are therefore associated with SWEs of broadly similar intensity.

6. Distribution system reliability performance during 2025/26

The following section reviews 2025/26 reliability performance by the EDC feeder category, using USAIDIn, USAIFIn and customer restoration. The assessment considers annual performance against historical averages and applicable reporting thresholds, as well as the principal factors influencing outcomes.

6.1 Overall Normalised Performance 2025/26

6.1.a Test for use of best endeavours

As detailed in Section 5.2, the test for determining if SA Power Networks has employed best endeavours in maintaining normalised reliability performance is no declining trend performance in:

- USAIDIn and USAIFIn at the aggregate distribution system and each feeder category level;
- Annual contribution to USAIDIn from weather caused interruptions; and
- Annual contribution to USAIDIn from equipment failure caused interruptions.

6.1.b Aggregate distribution system reliability performance

Table 14 shows that in 2025/26, normalised distribution-network reliability performance was varied. USAIDIn was 158 minutes, which was 8 minutes above the implied overall target of 150 minutes. USAIFIn was 1.12 interruptions per customer, which was better than the implied overall target of 1.30 interruptions per customer.

Table 14: SA Distribution System's Unplanned Normalised Reliability Performance

	USAIDIn		USAIFIn	
	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
2025/26	150	158	1.30	1.12

These results indicate that, while customers experienced fewer interruptions than the implied target level, the average duration of interruptions was higher than the implied target. The USAIDIn outcome also represents a deterioration from recent years, while USAIFIn increased from the particularly strong outcomes recorded in 2023/24 and 2024/25. Both measures remain favourable compared with the longer-term historical period shown in Figure 6, particularly compared with results prior to 2014/15.

Figure 6: Distribution system normalised reliability (excludes MEDs)





Figure 7 shows that restoration performance did not meet the applicable targets in 2025/26. Approximately 24% of customers were restored after more than three hours, compared with a target of 20%, while approximately 9% were restored after more than five hours, compared with a target of 7%.

Figure 7: Customer restoration of supply




Performance deteriorated compared with 2024/25 and continued the upward trend evident since 2021/22. This indicates that a higher proportion of customers experienced extended interruptions, contributing to the elevated USAIDIn outcome for the distribution network.

Restoration times were materially affected by the reduced effectiveness of SWER sectionalisers during periods of high solar PV penetration. This increased the time required to patrol long rural feeders and locate faults. The scale of outages associated with insulator pollution also challenged restoration timeframes.

SA Power Networks has commenced a program to replace all 580 SWER sectionalisers with reclosers, with approximately 100 replacements planned each year. The program commenced in 2025 and is 20% complete. A complementary line fault indicator installation program also commenced in 2025 and is approximately 90% complete. These initiatives will improve fault-location, isolation and restoration capability, reduce patrol times, and support more effective targeting of asset and network improvements in areas with repeated or prolonged outages.

6.1.c USAIDIn Cause Contribution to Normalised Performance

Figure 8 shows that weather-related events remained the largest contributor to USAIDIn in 2025/26, increasing materially from the prior year. Asset-failure-related interruption duration also increased, while other causes remained comparatively low and stable. The overall increase in USAIDIn was therefore primarily driven by weather-related impacts, including the widespread insulator-pollution events experienced on rural feeders, with asset failures providing a secondary contribution.

Figure 8: Normalised USAIDIn contribution due to weather and equipment failure**Table 15: Distribution system USAIDIn cause contributions**

USAIDIn	WEATHER	ASSET FAILURE	OTHER
2025/26	86	52	22
TSP	79	50	22

6.1.d Conclusion – normalised reliability performance 2025/26

The overall normalised reliability performance in 2025/26 was varied but remained favourable when compared with longer-term historical performance. USAIFIn was 1.12 interruptions per customer, better than the implied target of 1.30 interruptions per customer. USAIDIn was 158 minutes, which was marginally above the implied target of 150 minutes, but remained below the higher interruption-duration outcomes experienced across much of the earlier historical period.

Accordingly, the 2025/26 results do not indicate a broad, long-term decline in normalised distribution-network reliability performance. However, the increase in USAIDIn was not achieved.

The elevated interruption-duration outcome was primarily driven by weather-related impacts, including widespread insulator-pollution events on rural feeders. Weather-related causes contributed approximately 86 minutes of USAIDIn in 2025/26 and were the largest contributor to the annual result.

While asset-failure-related USAIDIn increased from approximately 46 minutes in 2024/25 to 52 minutes in 2025/26, the longer-term cause data does not identify a sustained decline in performance due to equipment failure. Asset-failure impacts have varied over time and the 2025/26 result is broadly within the range observed in recent years. The evidence therefore demonstrates that the principal driver of the deterioration in 2025/26 was weather-related events, rather than systemic equipment-performance deterioration.

Customer restoration performance did not meet target levels: approximately 24% of customers were restored after more than three hours, against a target of 20%, and approximately 9% were restored after more than five hours, against a target of 7%. These outcomes were affected by the scale of non-MED severe weather events, including insulator-pollution-related faults, and by extended fault-location and patrol times on long rural feeders where SWER sectionalisers were less effective during periods of high solar PV penetration.

Despite these challenges, we continued to respond to and restore customers following non-MED severe weather events. The 2025/26 outcome identifies opportunities to strengthen, rather than evidence of a fundamental decline in, network resilience. The programs underway including replacement of SWER sectionalisers with reclosers, installation of line fault indicators, expansion of feeder automation and targeted insulator remediation will improve fault location, isolation and restoration capability.

Consequently, SA Power Networks considers it employed best endeavours to maintain normalised reliability performance and achieve the EDC reliability targets in 2025/26. While the USAIDIn and customer-restoration targets were not achieved, the evidence indicates that this was principally due to elevated weather-related impacts rather than a sustained decline in equipment reliability or overall network performance.

6.2 MED Performance 2025/26

6.2.a Test to determine if performance during MEDs has been maintained

Section 5.3 outlines the test used to assess whether SA Power Networks has maintained its responsiveness in restoring supply to customers interrupted during MEDs.

6.2.b MED Performance during 2025/26

Two MEDs were recorded in 2025/26: one Category 1 MED and one Category 2 MED. Together, these events contributed 16.1 minutes to USAIDI and 0.050 interruptions per customer to USAIFI.

Table 16 sets out the dates of these MEDs, their USAIDI and USAIFI contributions, and the UCAIDI recorded for each event.

Table 16: Details of MED exclusions during 2025/26

Event #	MED Category	Dates	USAIDI	USAIFI	UCAIDI	Comment
1	Cat 1	29 Aug 25	6.0	0.028	215	Severe weather event
2	Cat 2	22 Nov 25	10.1	0.022	472	Severe storm event
Total		5 days	16.1	0.050	327	

6.2.b.1 Cat 1 MED on 29 August 2025

On 29 August 2025, a significant severe weather event affected the Adelaide metropolitan area and surrounding regions. A deep low-pressure system and associated cold front produced damaging winds, heavy showers and thunderstorms, with wind gusts exceeding 100 km/h in parts of the metropolitan area. The event resulted in widespread tree damage, damage to electricity infrastructure, and interruptions to electricity supply across the distribution network.

The event caused multiple simultaneous faults across the distribution network, primarily due to vegetation contacting powerlines, damaged conductors, and other weather-related asset damage. At the peak of the event, approximately 6,000 customers were without electricity supply, requiring the activation of major incident management arrangements and a coordinated restoration response involving field crews, contractors and emergency services. The event contributed 6 minutes to USAIDI primarily affecting the GAMA region.

6.2.b.2 Cat 2 MED on 22 November 2025 – Port Pirie storm event.

On Saturday, 22 November, Port Pirie was impacted by a severe storm event involving wind gusts of up to 119 km/h, heavy rain and hail. The event caused significant damage to the local distribution network,

including 56 downed conductors and 12 damaged poles. A total of 4,864 customers in Port Pirie lost supply, contributing to 20,865 affected customers statewide.

SA Power Networks prioritised public safety and making the network safe before commencing restoration. The wider emergency response involved 207 personnel from the South Australian State Emergency Service, Country Fire Service and Metropolitan Fire Service. A total of 379 requests for assistance were recorded in Port Pirie.

SA Power Networks deployed 26 additional crews from Adelaide and surrounding regions, increasing the field response workforce to 61 personnel. Contractors also supported the response by undertaking non-specialised tasks. Supply was restored to all affected customers by approximately 8.30 pm on Monday, within 48 hours of the event.

The primary cause of the supply interruptions was severe weather, with destructive winds causing trees to fall into overhead powerlines. Port Pirie contributed 7.9 minutes to statewide USAIDI, compared with total statewide USAIDI of 10.1 minutes for that day.


6.2.C Equipment failure component of MEDs

Another indicator of whether SA Power Networks is appropriately maintaining the distribution system is the proportional contribution to USAIDI on MEDs that result from equipment failure outages. Figure 9 shows that weather and unknown causes were the primary contributors to MED USAIDI in 2025/26. This is consistent with the two MEDs being severe weather events, including the Port Pirie storm, which caused substantial damage to overhead network infrastructure.

The chart indicates that the contribution from equipment failure during MEDs was comparatively low in 2025/26 and was materially below the significant weather-related contribution. The 2025/26 result does not indicate that equipment failure was a material driver of MED performance or that there has been a sustained deterioration in equipment reliability.

The occurrence and severity of MEDs varies substantially between years. Accordingly, annual MED cause contributions should be interpreted in the context of the number, geographic extent and severity of events experienced in each year. In 2025/26, the available evidence indicates that MED interruption duration was primarily driven by severe weather and associated network damage, rather than underlying equipment failure.

Figure 9: MEDs USAIDI contribution from causes weather and equipment failure



6.2.d MED performance conclusion

The two MEDs in 2025/26 were severe weather events that caused widespread network damage and required substantial restoration responses. SA Power Networks activated major incident management arrangements, mobilised additional internal and contractor resources, and coordinated with emergency services to restore supply safely and efficiently.

The available evidence indicates that SA Power Networks maintained its capability and responsiveness to restore customers affected by MEDs during 2025/26. While the equipment-failure contribution to MED USAIDI was above the historic average, this was influenced by the severity and infrastructure damage associated with the events, particularly the Port Pirie storm. Non-MED equipment-failure-related USAIDI remained below the long-term historic average.

On this basis, SA Power Networks considers that its responsiveness to restore customers affected by MEDs was maintained in 2025/26.

6.3 Conclusion – overall reliability outcome for 2025/26

Overall, SA Power Networks considers it employed best endeavours to maintain normalised reliability performance and restore customers safely during MEDs in 2025/26. While the USAIDI and customer-restoration targets were not achieved, the performance was principally driven by elevated weather-related impacts and associated restoration challenges, rather than a sustained decline in underlying equipment reliability or network capability.

7. EDC Feeder Category reliability performance

7.1 Introduction

In the sections to follow, SA Power Networks assesses each of the feeder categories' reliability performance in three steps:

- Determining if the normalised performance achieves the reliability targets.
- Determining if over the last few years there has been any declining trend in performance.
- Where the normalised performance is worse than the EDC normalised targets, explaining that performance by removing the effects of local SWEs, other one-off type events and analysing the annual USAIDIn cause contributions.

7.2 CBD feeder category normalised performance

7.2.a Introduction

The feeders within the CBD category supply 1% of customers, using 0.4% of the distribution system. These feeders supply the Adelaide CBD and immediate surrounds. Due to the very low customer numbers and low performance targets, the reliability of the CBD feeders is very sensitive and can be significantly impacted by a single interruption.

7.2.b Normalised reliability performance

Table 17 shows that the CBD feeder reliability performance was strong in 2025/26. Normalised USAIDIn was 8.9 minutes, which was better than the service-standard target of 15 minutes, the TSP historic average of 16.2 minutes, and the reporting threshold of 20.2 minutes.

Normalised USAIFIn was 0.078 interruptions per customer, which was also better than the target of 0.15, the TSP historic average of 0.147, and the reporting threshold of 0.200.

Table 17: CBD reliability by interruption cause

	Asset failure	Weather	Other	Total
USAIDIn				
2025/26	4.2	2.1	2.6	8.9
TSP Ave	13.0	2.1	1.2	16.2
Reporting Threshold	14.2	4.1	1.9	20.2
Target				15
USAIFIn				
2025/26	0.052	0.013	0.013	0.078
TSP Ave	0.099	0.029	0.019	0.147
Reporting Threshold	0.115	0.051	0.034	0.200
Target				0.15

Figure 10 and Figure 11 show that 2025/26 was one of the strongest reliability outcomes across the historical period. There is no evidence of a declining trend in either interruption duration or frequency. Rather, performance has generally remained below the applicable targets since 2020/21, aside from isolated annual variation.

Figure 10: CBD feeder category USAIDIn




Figure 11: CBD feeder category USAIFIn





Figure 12 shows that customer restoration performance also improved materially in 2025/26. Approximately 5% of customers were restored after more than one hour, compared with a target of 11%, and approximately 2% were restored after more than two hours, compared with a target of 4%. Both measures were better than 2024/25 and among the stronger outcomes recorded in recent years.

Figure 12: CBD feeder category CROsn (≥ 1 hour and > 2 hours)

7.2.c Conclusion

Given the small number of customers supplied by CBD feeders and the low performance targets, annual results are sensitive to individual outage events. Notwithstanding this sensitivity, the 2025/26 results demonstrate that normalised CBD feeder reliability performance and customer restoration performance were maintained at favourable levels.

7.3 Urban feeder category normalised performance

7.3.a Introduction

The Urban feeders supply about 69% of customers utilising about 29% (i.e. 24,535 route kms) of the distribution system. They supply the Adelaide Metropolitan area (excluding part of the Adelaide CBD and some major regional towns (e.g. Mt Gambier and Pt Augusta).

7.3.b Normalised reliability performance

Urban feeder reliability performance was favourable in 2025/26. USAIDIn was 109.6 minutes, marginally better than the target of 110 minutes and below the reporting threshold of 125 minutes. USAIFIn was 0.93 interruptions per customer, better than the target of 1.15 and below the reporting threshold of 1.35.

The small decline in urban reliability performance reflects, in part, an increase in vegetation-related outages. Metropolitan Adelaide's tree canopy increased by approximately 4% between 2018/19 and 2022²¹, and SA Power Networks has observed increasing vegetation-related outages associated with greater vegetation cover in the vicinity of the network. Vegetation outside prescribed clearance zones can be blown into overhead network assets during severe weather events, resulting in unplanned interruptions.

There was also a notable increase in low-voltage (LV) outages attributable to asset failures. Historically, LV asset failures have remained stable and have not had a material impact on overall reliability performance. The recent increase represents a change from this historical trend and has been identified as an area for further investigation in 2026/27, including the underlying asset types, failure modes and geographic distribution of these outages.

²¹ Green Adelaide, Urban Heat and Tree Canopy Mapping Project (2022).

Conversely, over the past two years, SA Power Networks has significantly increased the installation of animal guards. This has reduced animal-related incidents and delivered a reduction of more than 40% in USAIDIn associated with flying fox-related outages.

Table 18: Reliability performance of the Urban feeder category

Urban feeders	USAIDIn	USAIFIn	% Restored 2 Hrs	% Restored 3 Hrs
2025/26	109.6	0.93	27	13.5
Target	110	1.15	27	11
Reporting threshold	125	1.35	29.5	13.5

The historical results show that both interruption duration and interruption frequency have improved materially from the higher levels recorded in the earlier years of the period. While USAIDIn increased from the stronger results achieved in 2023/24 and 2024/25, the 2025/26 outcome remained within target and does not indicate a sustained decline in urban feeder reliability. USAIFIn also increased marginally compared with 2024/25 but remained well below target and favourable compared with the longer-term trend.

Figure 13: Urban feeder category USAIDIn






Figure 14: Urban feeder category USAIFIn



As can be seen in Figure 15, customer restoration performance was varied. Approximately 27% of customers were restored after more than two hours, meeting the target of 27%, while 13.5% were restored after more than three hours, above the target of 11% but equal to the reporting threshold of 13.5%. The three-hour restoration results deteriorated compared with 2024/25 and is above the recent historical performance achieved between 2019/20 and 2020/21.

Figure 15: Urban feeder category CRoS (> 2 hours and > 3 hours)



7.3.c Conclusion

The Urban feeder reliability performance was favourable in 2025/26. USAIDIn and USAIFIn was better than the target and below the reporting threshold.

Customer restoration performance was varied. Approximately 27% of customers were restored after more than two hours, meeting the target of 27%, while 13.5% were restored after more than three hours, above the target of 11% but equal to the reporting threshold. The three-hour restoration results deteriorated compared with 2024/25 and is above the recent historical performance achieved between 2019/20 and 2020/21.

Overall, normalised urban feeder reliability achieved both EDC service-standard targets in 2025/26, and there is no evidence of a sustained declining trend in USAIDIn or USAIFIn. However, the elevated proportion of customers restored after more than three hours did not meet the required performance target.

The decrease in performance is primarily due to an increase in weather impacts over the past 12 months which has resulted in longer restoration timeframes.

SA Power Networks applied best endeavours to meet the EDC's Urban feeder targets for USAIDIn, USAIFIn and customer restoration of supply during 2025/26.

7.4 Rural Short feeder category normalised performance

7.4.a Introduction

The Rural Short (RS) feeders supply about 15% of customers utilising about 15% (i.e. 12,587 route kms) of the distribution system. These feeders supply customers in the fringe areas of the Adelaide Metropolitan area and most regional towns (e.g. Victor Harbor).

7.4.b Normalised reliability performance

Normalised reliability performance for Rural Short feeders achieved both EDC service-standard targets in 2025/26. As can be seen in Table 19, USAIDIn was 182 minutes, better than the target of 200 minutes and below the reporting threshold of 220 minutes. USAIFIn was 1.30 interruptions per customer, better than the target of 1.65 and below the reporting threshold of 1.85.

The 2025/26 USAIDIn result represented an increase from the strong 2024/25 outcome but remained within target and was consistent with the general range of performance achieved over the past decade. USAIFIn also increased compared with 2024/25 but remained well below the target and historical outcomes recorded in the earlier years of the series.

Table 19: Rural short performance (normalised)

Rural Short feeders	USAIDIn	USAIFIn	% Restored 3 Hrs	% Restored 5 hrs
2025/26	182	1.30	29.6	9.2
Target	200	1.65	27	8
Reporting threshold	220	1.85	29.5	10.5

Figure 16: Rural short feeder category USAIDIn






Figure 17: Rural short feeder category USAIFIn




Customer restoration performance was varied. 29.6% of customers were restored after more than three hours, marginally above the target of 27% and just above the reporting threshold of 29.5%. Likewise, 9.2% of customers were restored after more than five hours, above the target of 8%, but below the reporting threshold of 10.5%.

Figure 18: Rural short feeder category CRoS_n (> 3hours and > 5hours)



The restoration outcomes show that, although the frequency and duration reliability targets were achieved, a higher proportion of customers experienced longer restoration times than targeted. This is consistent with the practical challenges of fault location, patrol and restoration on geographically dispersed rural networks and the weather impacts associated with insulator pollution as can be seen in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Rural short USAIDIn interruption causes



7.4.c Conclusion

SA Power Networks achieved the normalised USAIDIn and USAIFIn targets for Rural Short feeders in 2025/26. While performance was weaker than the particularly strong 2024/25 result, both measures remained within target and there is no evidence of a sustained declining trend in normalised reliability performance.

The increase in USAIDIn was primarily associated with weather-related interruption impacts rather than a systemic decline in equipment performance. Asset-failure-related USAIDIn remained within the historic range and the longer-term cause trend does not indicate deterioration due to equipment failure.

Restoration performance did not achieve the relevant targets, and the three-hour result marginally exceeded its reporting threshold. We have commenced a program aimed at reducing the duration of rural outages. Works include the ongoing replacement of SWER sectionalisers with reclosers, installation of line fault indicators, feeder automation and targeted asset and network improvements. These initiatives improve fault location, isolation and supply restoration, particularly on rural feeders.

On this basis, SA Power Networks considers it employed best endeavours to maintain Rural Short feeder reliability in 2025/26. The category achieved its normalised reliability targets, and the identified restoration-performance opportunity is being addressed through targeted operational and network improvement programs.

7.5 Rural Long feeder category normalised performance

7.5.a Introduction

Rural Long (RL) feeders serve approximately 15% of customers while utilising around 55% of the distribution network, equivalent to 49,277 route kilometres, primarily supplying rural areas.

7.5.b Normalised reliability performance

The Rural Long feeder reliability did not achieve the normalised EDC reliability targets in 2025/26. USAIDIn was 371 minutes, exceeding the target of 290 minutes and the reporting threshold of 330 minutes and USAIFIn was 1.87 interruptions per customer, above the target of 1.75, but below the reporting threshold of 2.10 as demonstrated in Table 20.

Table 20: Rural long feeder performance (normalised)

Rural Long feeders	USAIDIn	USAIFIn	% Restored 4 Hrs	% Restored 7 hrs
2025/26	371	1.87	45.9	14.1
Target	290	1.75	30	10
Reporting threshold	330	2.10	32.5	12.5

Figure 20 illustrates the 2025/26 USAIDIn result was lower than the elevated 2024/25 outcome but remained substantially above target and above the range of performance achieved between 2019/20 and 2022/23.


Figure 20: Rural long feeder category USAIDIn

Figure 21 identifies that USAIFIn also increased from 2024/25 and was above target. The results show a deterioration in Rural Long feeder performance over the past three years, particularly in interruption duration.



Figure 21: Rural long feeder category USAIFIn

Figure 22 shows customer restoration performance also did not meet the applicable targets. 45.9% of customers were restored after more than four hours, compared with a target of 30% and reporting threshold of 32.5% and 14.1% of customers were restored after more than seven hours, compared with a target of 10% and reporting threshold of 12.5%.

These results indicate that a material proportion of customers affected by Rural Long feeder interruptions experienced extended restoration times. This reflects the geographic length and dispersed nature of these feeders, the time required to patrol and locate faults, and the scale of simultaneous outages experienced during the summer period materially due to insulator pollution.


Figure 22: Rural long feeder category CRoS_n (> 4hours and > 7hours)

7.5.c Major factors influencing Rural Long reliability performance

Figure 23 shows that Weather-related events were the largest contributor to Rural Long USAIDIn in 2025/26, contributing approximately 225 minutes. While this was lower than the approximately 245 minutes recorded in 2024/25, it remained elevated compared with much of the historical period.

The high weather-related contribution is consistent with widespread insulator-pollution-related flashovers experienced across rural long feeders during summer 2025/26. Elevated pollutant loading, prolonged dry conditions and deterioration of cycloaliphatic polymer insulators combined to increase the likelihood of flashovers and associated customer interruptions.

Asset failure contributed approximately 100 minutes to USAIDIn, broadly consistent with 2024/25 and within the range observed in several earlier years. The cause analysis does not indicate that the 2025/26 deterioration was driven by a sustained decline in general equipment reliability. Rather, the principal driver was the elevated weather-related interruption contribution, including the identified insulator pollution issue. Other causes contributed approximately 42 minutes.

Figure 23: Long Rural USAIDIn interruption causes

As can be seen, there are a number of contributors to the poor USAIDIn, USAIFIn and restoration of supply performance of our Rural Long feeders over 2024/25 and 2025/26. The major causes for the increase contribution to USAIDIn, USAIFIn and customer restoration were:

1. An increase in weather related environmental factors (e.g. no rain permitted dust and salt pollution build up on insulators) which led to significant increase in unplanned outages; and
2. The decline in the performance of 19kV SWER feeders where sectionalisers are not operating due to the feed in voltage from solar PV.

7.5.d Mitigating the impact of insulator pollution

Insulator pollution was a material contributor to the poor reliability performance on rural long feeders during the summer of 2024/25. The issue re-emerged at scale in early 2026, resulting in widespread customer interruptions, particularly on sub-transmission lines. While insulator washing and wetter conditions have reduced the immediate incidence of faults, there remains a significant risk of recurrence in summer 2026/27 unless the underlying causes are addressed.

SA Power Networks engaged an expert consultant to undertake an engineering review of insulator failures. The review identified two principal causal factors:

- **Increasing environmental pollution loading**, including more frequent elevated atmospheric sea-salt concentrations since 2022, prolonged dry conditions from 2024, and a sharp increase in Equivalent Salt Deposit Density (**ESDD**) in late 2025.
- **Premature degradation of cycloaliphatic polymer insulators**, which can become roughened through UV exposure. This reduces their ability to withstand heavy pollution and moisture, increasing the likelihood of flashovers.

The combination of elevated pollutant accumulation and deteriorated polymer-insulator performance is considered the primary cause of the widespread interruptions experienced over the past two summers. Although modelled ESDD levels in 2026 were lower than those in 2025, the effects of the earlier pollution event are understood to have accelerated the underlying degradation of affected insulators.

SA Power Networks has established a coordinated organisational response, initially led through the Crisis Management Team and now through a multidisciplinary Taskforce. The response focuses on identifying and remediating high-risk assets, reducing customer impacts, and maintaining proactive and transparent community communication.

A three-part intervention assessment was completed:

- **Automated switching:** Fifteen smart load switches were installed and integrated into the Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS) feeder automation system in May 2026. This provides a high benefit-to-cost outcome by isolating faulted sections more quickly and reducing the number of customers affected by individual flashovers.
- **Insulator replacement:** Cycloaliphatic polymer insulators will be replaced with either silicone or very-heavy-pollution-rated porcelain insulators. Both options offer improved pollution performance and greater resistance to UV-related degradation; porcelain provides the highest performance but at more than twice the cost of silicone.
- **Silicone coating:** A helicopter-applied silicone coating will be used as a temporary, three-to-five-year treatment to improve the performance of selected existing polymer insulators and enable rapid coverage across large areas.

An optimised program combining replacement and silicone coating is planned for delivery in Q3 and Q4 2026. The program is expected to cost approximately \$7 million, require around 25,000 field workforce hours, and represent one of the organisation's largest field mobilisations in at least two decades. It will replace insulators on approximately 3,300 structures across the Yorke Peninsula, Eyre Peninsula and South East, with silicone coating expected to be applied to approximately 2,000 additional structures. The work will be delivered by redirecting existing resources and deferring lower-priority work to 2027.

Sub-transmission interruptions accounted for more than 85% of customer interruptions associated with this issue. The relevant polymer insulators in affected areas have been identified, while review of the SWER network—which accounted for the remaining interruptions—is continuing.

Customer and community engagement is underway, including targeted communications for affected communities and specific information on helicopter operations and silicone coating activities. Recent coordinated feedback from 47 residents supplied by a Yorke Peninsula SWER line, provided through ESCOSA, underscores the significant customer impact of repeated interruptions and voltage fluctuations. It reinforces the need for visible reliability improvements, clear communication and sustained engagement, which we are proactively undertaking. Recent CSAT results show a significant improvement in customer satisfaction in the regions most affected by the insulator-pollution outages.

7.5.e Mitigating the impact of solar PV on SWERs

Sectionalisers are used to mitigate the impact of outages, and installed to limit the number of customers affected by a fault on the feeder to those customers downstream of the sectionaliser, with other customers supplied by the feeder only seeing a momentary interruption. For a sectionaliser to work it must have zero voltage on the downstream side of the recloser. Increasingly, downstream customer solar PV installations are preventing the voltage from decreasing to zero²², adversely impacting sectionaliser operations. This results in longer patrol times to locate and then repair the fault, as the whole feeder must be patrolled instead of just the section downstream of the sectionaliser.

Restoration times for rural lines were materially affected by the reduced effectiveness of SWER sectionalisers during periods of high solar PV penetration. This increased the time required to patrol long rural feeders and locate faults.

In response, SA Power Networks has commenced a remediation program as follows:

- Replacement of all 580 SWER sectionalisers with reclosers, with approximately 100 replacements planned each year. The program commenced in 2025/26 and is due to be completed by June 2030. The program is 20% approximately complete.
- Installation of line fault indicators. This program also commenced in 2025 and is approximately 90% complete.

These initiatives will improve fault-location, isolation and restoration capability, reduce patrol times, and support more effective targeting of asset and network improvements in areas with repeated or prolonged outages.

7.5.f Conclusion

Rural Long feeder normalised reliability performance was not maintained at the EDC target level in 2025/26. USAIDIn and USAIFin both exceeded their respective targets, and customer restoration performance exceeded both the targets and reporting thresholds.

²² Inverters on Solar PV systems are supposed to disconnect from the distribution network within 2 seconds of seeing no supply, however, it is taking around five seconds for inverters to disconnect. This longer time frame results in the sectionaliser failing to open due to voltage being present. It is unclear if this is a non-compliance with our requirements or because of other Solar systems giving the appearance of the system supply still being available.

The adverse outcome was principally driven by widespread, weather-related insulator-pollution events, rather than a general deterioration in equipment-failure performance. These events had a material effect on both customer interruption duration and restoration times across geographically dispersed rural feeders.

SA Power Networks has applied best endeavours to address the emerging reliability risk. This has included immediate insulator washing and prioritised fault response; specialist engineering analysis of the root causes; installation of 15 smart load switches to improve feeder fault isolation and restoration; and development of a substantial remediation program for delivery in Q3 and Q4 2026. The program will replace high-risk polymer insulators on approximately 3,300 structures and apply targeted silicone coating to approximately 2,000 structures, subject to final scope confirmation.

In addition, the replacement of SWER sectionalisers with reclosers and installation of line fault indicators will improve fault location, isolation and restoration capability on rural networks. These actions are intended to materially reduce the likelihood, extent and duration of pollution-related interruptions before summer 2026/27.

7.6 Overall conclusion

Table 21 compares the number of reliability measures that achieved their targets, exceeded targets but remained below reporting thresholds, and exceeded reporting thresholds in 2025/26 with the average, best and worst outcomes over the target-setting period.

The 2025/26 result was broadly comparable with the target-setting-period average. In 2025/26, eight measures achieved their targets, compared with an average of nine. A further four measures exceeded their targets but remained below their reporting thresholds, consistent with the target-setting-period average. Four measures exceeded their reporting thresholds, compared with an average of three.

Table 21: Overall performance

	2025/26	Average TSP	Best (2014/15)	Worst (2010/11)
Targets achieved	8	9	16	3
> target & < RT	4	4	0	7
> RT	4	3	0	6

While the overall outcome was broadly comparable with average historical performance, the four measures exceeding reporting thresholds were principally associated with Rural Long feeder reliability and customer restoration performance. These outcomes were materially affected by widespread weather-related insulator-pollution events during summer 2025/26.

SA Power Networks considers that it employed best endeavours to maintain reliability performance during 2025/26. While not all normalised reliability and customer restoration targets were achieved, the adverse outcomes were principally associated with severe weather-related events, including widespread insulator pollution on rural long feeders, rather than evidence of a sustained deterioration in underlying equipment performance.

SA Power Networks responded through immediate operational actions, enhanced incident management, engineering investigation and a substantial targeted remediation program. These actions demonstrate an active and proportionate response to the identified reliability risks and are intended to improve performance ahead of summer 2026/27.

8. EDC Region reliability performance

8.1 Introduction

In addition to reporting on feeder categories we must also report reliability performance across ten regions: nine geographic areas and a separate grouping comprising feeders serving the major rural townships. The ten regions are:

- Adelaide Business Area (**ABA** - same as those feeders classified as CBD);
- Greater Adelaide Metropolitan Area (**GAMA**);
- Major regional centres (**MRC** – includes the townships of Pt Lincoln, Whyalla, Pt August, Pt Pirie, Murray Bridge, Mt Gambier, Stirling-Aldgate, Mt Barker and Victor Harbour)
- Barossa and Mid-North (**BMN**);
- Eastern Hills (**EH**);
- Eyre Peninsula (**UNE**);
- Fleurieu Peninsula (**FP** – includes Kangaroo Island);
- Riverland and Murraylands (**RM**);
- Southeast (**SE**); and
- Upper North (**UN**).

The following sections detail the assessment criteria that SA Power Networks will use to determine if the historic reliability performance of the ten regions has been maintained. These criteria will then be used to assess whether or not each region's reliability performance has been maintained.

8.2 Assessment criteria for determining if a region's reliability has been maintained.

The two measures used to monitor reliability performance of a distribution system due to unplanned interruptions are:

- USAIDIn (the average time customers are without supply in minutes per annum); and
- USAIFIn (the average number of interruptions experienced per annum).

These measures are normalised to exclude interruptions that start on a MED, as these can significantly impact on the reliability performance of a region. Once MEDs are excluded from a region's USAIDI and USAIFI result, the remaining variability is generally due to either:

- Localised or state-wide SWEs that don't result in a MED; or
- one off, non-systemic interruptions.

In the sections to follow, SA Power Networks assesses whether each region's reliability performance is being maintained by examining the long-term trend, over several years, in:

- normalised USAIDI (ie USAIDIn which excludes MEDs); and
- normalised USAIFI (ie USAIFIn which excludes MEDs)

Where the performance is outside normal variation²³ we will detail the reasons for the excursion and, if not systemic, conclude that reliability performance is being maintained.

The process to determine if reliability has been maintained for a region will involve assessing the following two criteria:

- Is the historic reliability performance²⁴ being maintained (i.e. is there no long-term decline in performance and performance is better than the equivalent reporting threshold); and
- Is the non-achievement of the target related to one-off type events or SWE (i.e. not a systemic issue).

Where the first criterion is achieved, it means that the performance in that year is better than the historic average, consequently, it is appropriate to conclude that reliability for that region has been maintained. Also, if the second criterion is met, in that there is no declining trend, then the reliability for that region has been maintained. Consequently, where either of these two criteria are met the reliability for the region has been maintained.

8.3 Summary of regional performance

In 2025/26, reliability was maintained or improved against historic performance in the Adelaide Business Area, Major Regional Centres, Eastern Hills, Fleurieu Peninsula and Kangaroo Island, and Upper North. Interruption frequency was also maintained at favourable levels in the Greater Adelaide Metropolitan Area, Riverland and Murraylands, and South East, although these regions experienced elevated interruption duration.

The most significant adverse result was in the Barossa, Mid-North and Yorke Peninsula, where summer insulator pollution caused widespread rural feeder interruptions. Eyre Peninsula performance also remained elevated, particularly in interruption duration and frequency during the summer period. The targeted automation, insulator replacement and silicone-coating programs planned for 2026 are intended to address these underlying risks and improve rural reliability ahead of summer 2026/27.

8.4 Adelaide Business Area

The Adelaide Business Area category feeders supply 1% of customers²⁵, using 0.3% of the distribution system. These feeders supply the Adelaide CBD and surrounds. Due to the very low customer numbers and low targets, the performance of the CBD feeders can be significantly affected by one-off interruptions.

Table 22 highlights the Adelaide Business Area USAIDIn and USAIFIn performance for 2025/26, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 22: Adelaide business area historic performance comparison


Adelaide business area	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	9	21	25
USAIFIn	0.08	0.18	0.23

Figure 24 shows that USAIDIn and USAIFIn performance improved materially compared with 2024/25 and was significantly better than the historical average.

²³ Outside normal variation means that it is outside the reporting threshold as introduced by ESCOSA for the 2020-25 RCP.

²⁴ Historic average is the average reliability performance over the 15-year period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020.

²⁵ In addition, there are about 100,000 people living and working in the CBD each day.

Figure 24: Adelaide Business Area reliability performance

Conclusion

The ABA reliability performance improved substantially in 2025/26 compared with 2024/25. Annual USAIDIn decreased from 19.8 minutes to 8.9 minutes, while annual USAIFIn decreased from 0.180 to 0.078 interruptions per customer.

Both measures were significantly better than their respective historical averages and represent some of the strongest annual ABA reliability outcomes across the available reporting periods. Performance was consistently strong across the year, with no material monthly reliability events evident.

The 2025/26 result indicates that ABA reliability performance has been maintained and improved, with no evidence of a long-term declining trend in either USAIDIn or USAIFIn. Continued delivery of the CBD cable replacement program will support sustained reliability outcomes in this critical customer area.

8.5 Greater Adelaide Metropolitan Area


The Greater Adelaide Metropolitan Area supplies about 622,600 customers representing about 65.7% of total customers.

Table 23 highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2025/26, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 23: Greater Adelaide metropolitan area reliability performance

Greater Adelaide metropolitan area	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	112	109	121
USAIFIn	0.94	1.23	1.43

Figure 25 shows that GAMA USAIDIn and USAIFIn performance declined in 2025/26 compared with 2024/25. Both measures remain favourable relative to the longer-term historical performance. The deterioration in performance was primarily driven by weather-related vegetation impacting the LV and 11kV network.

Figure 25: Greater Adelaide Metropolitan Area reliability performance

Conclusion

GAMA reliability performance declined in 2025/26 compared with 2024/25, with annual USAIDIn increasing from 89 to 112 minutes and annual USAIFIn increasing from 0.76 to 0.94 interruptions per customer.

The deterioration was concentrated over the summer period, particularly in January and February 2026, when USAIDIn reached 22.9 and 12.9 minutes respectively, and USAIFIn reached 0.174 and 0.128 interruptions per customer. The primary impacts were due to encroachment of vegetation during severe weather. These months were the principal contributors to the annual result.

USAIFIn remained better than the historical average. USAIDIn was above the historical average, although the 2025/26 result remains within the range of annual performance observed historically.

8.6 Major Regional Centres

Approximately 89,600 customers, representing 9.5% of the state's total, are supplied in the major regional cities that form the Major Regional Centres.


Table 24 highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2025/26 the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 24: Major regional centres reliability performance

Major Regional Centres	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	92	128	147
USAIFIn	0.78	1.25	1.70

In 2025/26, Major Regional Centres achieved improved reliability performance compared with 2024/25. USAIDIn decreased from 139 to 92 minutes, and USAIFIn decreased from 1.01 to 0.78 interruptions per customer.

This result represents a substantial improvement from the elevated interruption-duration outcome in 2024/25 and is favourable compared with the longer-term historical trend.

Figure 26 - Major regional centres reliability performance

Conclusion

Both USAIDIn and USAIFIn were better than the long-term historical average. The 2025/26 USAIDIn result was also within the range of performance achieved in recent years, while USAIFIn remained below one interruption per customer and improved on the prior year. There were no material, sustained reliability events evident during the year, although higher interruption duration and frequency were recorded during the summer months, particularly January and February.

Overall, the 2025/26 outcome demonstrates an improvement in reliability and indicates that reliability has been maintained across Major Regional Centres. On the basis of the performance results, SA Power Networks considers it has made best endeavours to maintain reliability in this customer category.

8.7 Barossa, Mid-North and Yorke Peninsula Region

Approximately 60,400 customers, or 6.4% of the total, are supplied in the Barossa, Mid-North, and Yorke Peninsula region.


Table 25 below highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2024/25, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 25: Barossa, Mid-North and Yorke Peninsula reliability performance

Barossa, Mid-North and Yorke Peninsula	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	358	209	236
USAIFIn	1.86	1.52	1.78

In 2025/26, reliability performance in the Barossa, Mid-North and Yorke Peninsula region deteriorated significantly. USAIDIn increased from approximately 253 to 358 minutes, while USAIFIn increased from around 1.2 to 1.9 interruptions per customer.

The 2025/26 outcome was among the poorest results recorded over the period shown and represents a substantial deterioration from 2024/25. The performance is consistent with the significant reliability impacts experienced on rural long feeders during summer, including insulator pollution-related interruptions.

Figure 27 - Barossa, Mid-North & Yorke Peninsula region reliability performance

Conclusion

Reliability performance in the Barossa, Mid-North and Yorke Peninsula region deteriorated significantly in 2025/26. Annual USAIDIn increased from 253 minutes in 2024/25 to 358 minutes, an increase of approximately 41%. Annual USAIFIn increased from 1.22 to 1.86 interruptions per customer, an increase of approximately 52%.

The deterioration was concentrated over the summer period. December 2025 to February 2026 contributed approximately 200 minutes, or 56%, of the annual USAIDIn result, and 0.87 interruptions per customer, or 47%, of annual USAIFIn. January and February were particularly significant, contributing 157 minutes and 0.65 interruptions per customer. This pattern is due to the widespread insulator-pollution impacts experienced on rural long feeders during summer 2025/26.

The 2025/26 USAIDIn result was the highest recorded across the 21-year period shown. USAIFIn was also among the highest results, exceeded only by the outcomes recorded in 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2009/10. The result therefore represents a material departure from the region's more recent reliability performance.

SA Power Networks applied best endeavours to manage the issue through immediate fault response and insulator washing, establishment of a coordinated organisational response, as explained further in Section 7.5.d.

8.8 Eastern Hills Region


About 33,000 (3.5% of the states) customers are supplied in the Eastern Hills region (which exclude customers in Stirling/Bridgewater and Mt Barker townships areas).

Table 26 below highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2025/26, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 26: Eastern Hills region reliability performance

Eastern Hills	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	269	295	371
USAIFIn	1.63	2.29	2.81

In 2025/26, Eastern Hills reliability performance improved compared with 2024/25. USAIDIn decreased from approximately 290 to 270 minutes, while USAIFIn increased slightly from approximately 1.6 to 1.7 interruptions per customer.

Figure 28 - Eastern Hills Region reliability performance

Conclusion

The 2025/26 USAIDIn outcome was better than the long-term historical average and continued the improvement from the higher interruption-duration outcomes experienced in several earlier years. USAIFIn remained well below the levels recorded in much of the historical period, although the modest year-on-year increase indicates a slightly higher number of interruption events.

Overall, the result indicates that interruption duration improved modestly and interruption frequency remained broadly stable demonstrating that the historic reliability performance has been maintained.

8.9 Eyre Peninsula Region

About 16,300 (1.7% of the states) customers are supplied in the Eyre Peninsula region which excludes selected HV feeders²⁶ in the cities of Pt Lincoln and Whyalla.

Table 27 below highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2025/26, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.


Table 27: Eyre Peninsula region reliability performance

Eyre Peninsula	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	537	497	577
USAIFIn	2.21	2.17	2.74

Figure 29 In 2025/26, reliability performance in the Eyre Peninsula region was broadly unchanged from 2024/25.

This decline in USAIDIn and USAIFIn is largely due to a significant rise in weather-related interruptions and substantial impacts from insulator pollution over the two years.

²⁶ Selected HV feeders in the Cities of Pt Lincoln and Whyalla are included in MRC.

Figure 29 - Eyre Peninsula Region reliability performance

Conclusion

Reliability performance in the Eyre Peninsula region was broadly unchanged in 2025/26 compared with 2024/25 and against the full historical period, the 2025/26 outcome is better than the very high interruption-duration and frequency results experienced in the mid-2000s.

Overall, reliability has been maintained relative to the immediately preceding year and it is better than the overall historical average. SA Power Networks considers it has made best endeavours to maintain reliability in the Eyre Peninsula region.

8.10 Fleurieu Peninsula

About 36,200 (3.8% of the states) customers are supplied in the Fleurieu Peninsula region (including Kangaroo Island).


Table 28 highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2025/26, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 28: Fleurieu Peninsula reliability performance

Fleurieu Peninsula	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	269	276	319
USAIFIn	2.12	2.15	2.76

Reliability performance in the Fleurieu Peninsula and Kangaroo Island region deteriorated in 2025/26 compared with the strong outcome achieved in 2024/25. That's said Fleurieu Peninsula reliability performance was marginally better than the historical average. USAIDIn was 269 minutes, compared with a historic average of 276 minutes, while USAIFIn was 2.12 interruptions per customer, compared with a historic average of 2.15.

Figure 30 shows that Fleurieu Peninsula and Kangaroo Island reliability performance in 2025/26 was broadly consistent with historic levels.

Figure 30 - Fleurieu Peninsula & KI Region reliability performance

Conclusion

Reliability performance in the Fleurieu Peninsula and Kangaroo Island region deteriorated in 2025/26 compared with the strong outcome achieved in 2024/25. Annual USAIDIn increased from 166.0 minutes to 268.5 minutes, while USAIFIn increased from 1.388 to 2.125 interruptions per customer.

The increase was driven principally by higher weather related interruption impacts from October 2025 to February 2026, with these months contributing approximately 182 minutes of USAIDIn and 1.39 interruptions per customer.

2025/26 performance was marginally better than the long-term historical average for both measures, which were also below their respective reporting thresholds. Accordingly, reliability can be considered to have been maintained against long-term historic performance.

8.11 Riverland and Murrayland Region

About 39,500 (4.2% of the states) customers are supplied in the Riverland and Murrayland region, which excludes selected HV feeders²⁷ in the City of Murray Bridge.


Table 29 highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2024/25, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 29: Riverland and Murrayland region reliability performance

Riverland & Murrayland	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	256	222	257
USAIFIn	1.28	1.40	1.59

Table 29 and Figure 31 shows that reliability performance in the Riverland and Murraylands region was varied in 2025/26. Annual USAIDIn was 256 minutes, which was above the historic average of 222 minutes and marginally below the reporting threshold of 257 minutes. USAIFIn was 1.28 interruptions per customer, which was better than the historic average of 1.40 and below the reporting threshold of 1.59.

²⁷ Selected HV feeders in the City of Murray Bridge are included in MRC.

Figure 31 - Riverland & Murraylands Region reliability performance

Conclusion

Reliability performance in the Riverland and Murraylands region was broadly maintained against long-term historic levels in 2025/26, although performance was varied across the two measures.

Annual USAIFIn was 1.28 interruptions per customer, which was better than the historic average of 1.40 and below the reporting threshold of 1.59. This demonstrates that interruption frequency remained favourable relative to historical performance.

Annual USAIDIn was 256.5 minutes, above the historic average of 222 minutes and marginally below the reporting threshold of 257 minutes. The increase in interruption duration was most evident during the summer months, particularly January and February 2026.

The 2025/26 result represents a deterioration from the strong 2024/25 outcome, when USAIDIn was 216.4 minutes and USAIFIn was 0.92 interruptions per customer. However, the annual results remain within the range of historical performance and do not, in isolation, demonstrate a sustained long-term decline. Therefore, overall, reliability was maintained relative to the long-term historical range, particularly for interruption frequency.

8.12 Southeast region

Approximately 29,900 customers, representing 3.2% of the state's total, are supplied in the Southeast region. This excludes certain high-voltage feeders within the City of Mount Gambier²⁸.

Table 30 highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2024/25, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.

Table 30: Southeast region reliability performance

Southeast	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	325	271	328
USAIFIn	1.81	2.03	2.20


In 2025/26, the South East reliability performance substantially improved compared to 2024/25, however, it was varied compared with historical results. USAIDIn was 325 minutes, which was above the historic average of 271 minutes and close to the reporting threshold of 328 minutes. Conversely, USAIFIn was 1.81

²⁸ There are selected HV feeders in Mt Gambier included in the MRC.

interruptions per customer, better than the historic average of 2.03 and below the reporting threshold of 2.20.

The decline in USAIDIn and USAIFIn performance is primarily due to a rise in weather-related interruptions and the substantial impact of insulator pollution, combined with asset failures. Notably, the performance of our rural long feeders has worsened, as sectionalisers have proven ineffective during periods of high solar generation. This has amplified the impact of asset failures, with more customers affected and longer fault location timeframes.

Figure 32 - South East Region reliability performance



Conclusion

Annual USAIDIn decreased from 470 minutes to 325 minutes, while USAIFIn decreased from 2.13 to 1.81 interruptions per customer. When assessed against long-term historical performance, the outcome was varied. USAIFIn was better than the historic average of 2.03 interruptions per customer and remained below the reporting threshold of 2.20, indicating that interruption frequency was maintained at a favourable level. USAIDIn, at 325 minutes, was above the historic average of 271 minutes and close to the reporting threshold of 328 minutes, indicating that interruption duration remained elevated.

The 2025/26 result is within the historical range and represents a material improvement on the prior year.

8.13 Upper North Region

Approximately 11,900 customers, accounting for 1.3% of the state's total, are supplied in the Upper North region. This excludes specific high-voltage feeders in the cities of Port Augusta and Port Pirie.

Table 31 highlights the performance of USAIDIn and USAIFIn for 2024/25, the historic 15-year period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 average performance and the reporting threshold.


Table 31: Upper North region reliability performance

Upper North	2025/26	Historic Ave.	Reporting threshold
USAIDIn	262	434	540
USAIFIn	1.38	1.76	2.12

In 2025/26, Upper North reliability performance was better than historic levels across both measures. USAIDIn was 262 minutes, materially better than the historic average of 434 minutes and well below the reporting threshold of 540 minutes. USAIFIn was 1.38 interruptions per customer, better than the historic average of 1.76 and below the reporting threshold of 2.12.

Overall, the results demonstrate that reliability performance was maintained at a favourable level in 2025/26, with customers experiencing both fewer interruptions and less interruption duration than the long-term historical average.

Figure 33 - Upper North Region reliability performance



Conclusion

Reliability performance in the Upper North was maintained at a favourable level in 2025/26. Annual USAIDIn was substantially better than the historic average and well below the reporting threshold. USAIFIn was also better than the historic average and below the reporting threshold of 2.12.

Performance improved materially compared with 2024/25, particularly in interruption duration, which reduced from 401 minutes to 262 minutes. While interruption frequency improved only marginally, it remained within a favourable historical range.

Overall, the 2025/26 result demonstrates that reliability was maintained relative to historic performance, with both the duration and frequency of customer interruptions better than long-term averages.

9. Public lighting performance

9.1 Introduction

This section reports on our performance during the 2025/26 regulatory year against the public lighting reporting requirements in the ESCOSAs EDC. It includes information on our delivery of public lighting services, including relevant performance outcomes, trends and initiatives undertaken during the year.

9.2 Public lighting performance


During 2025/26, SA Power Networks continued to monitor public lighting performance through reported street-light outages (SLOs) and the average time taken to complete repairs across urban and other areas. These measures provide an important view of customer experience and network service performance.

This year is particularly significant because the GSL payments for public lighting ceased from 1 July 25. While the financial penalty mechanism has been removed, reliable public lighting remains important to customers, councils and the community. We now publicly report our public-lighting performance, enabling customers, ESCOSA and other stakeholders to monitor outcomes and compare performance with historic trends. This public report is in addition to the monthly reporting we provide to Councils.

In 2025/26, SA Power Networks was responsible for 222,164 street lights at year end: 181,277 urban and 40,887 other-area lights. The LED fleet increased during the year to 146,426 lights, representing approximately 66% of the total fleet.

Figure 34 shows our public lighting performance for 2024/25 and 2025/26. The following sections provide commentary on our performance.

Figure 34: Public lighting performance



As the first full year following the cessation of public-lighting GSL payments, 2025/26 provides an important baseline for ongoing public reporting under the EDC. SA Power Networks will continue to monitor performance, investigate emerging trends and publicly report outcomes to support accountability and continuous improvement.

Reported faults

A total of 22,158 street-light faults were reported for assets for which SA Power Networks were responsible:

- **Urban (metro):** 18,367 faults (83%)
- **Other areas:** 3,791 faults (17%)

Most faults were reported through our online Street Light Outage tool (18,079; 82%), with a further 3,009 reported by telephone and 1,070 automatically reported.

Repair timeliness

Overall, metro (urban) faults were repaired in an average of 7.92 business days for the year, with 4,976 repairs completed outside the five-business-day benchmark. The other-area faults were repaired in an average of 4.91 business days; 388 repairs exceeded the applicable ten-business-day benchmark.

Simple faults were the main driver of repair volumes:

- Urban: 13,820 simple faults, repaired in 4.95 business days on average. 20.8% were completed outside five business days.
- Other areas: 3,547 simple faults, repaired in 5.20 business days on average. 16.6% were completed outside five business days.

Urban simple-fault performance improved significantly from 6.41 days in January–March to 5.32 days in April–June, though the year-end result remained just below the five-day target. Other-area performance also improved from 6.48 days to 5.05 days over the same periods.

Complex-fault performance was stronger against its 30-business-day benchmark:

- Urban: 4,547 complex faults, average repair time 16.79 business days; 8.5% completed outside 30 business days.
- Other areas: 244 complex faults, average repair time 11.16 business days; 11.1% completed outside 30 business days.

Urban complex-fault repairs improved over the year, declining from 19.21 business days in January–March to 17.82 days in April–June.

The principal reason for delayed simple-fault repairs was “Other”, accounting for 2,483 urban and 522 other-area delayed repairs. These figures included a significant number of backlog works which were completed. Other notable contributors included blocked access/parked vehicles, incorrect or incomplete asset/GIS data, emergency restoration and stock issues.

For complex faults, the main delays related to access issues, cable faults and traffic-control requirements.

9.3 Conclusion

Maintaining the LED transition remains important, with the LED public-lighting fleet increasing from 143,531 to 146,426 lights during 2025/26, supporting a more efficient and potentially more reliable network.

The key operational improvement opportunity is urban repair timeliness: urban faults took an average 7.92 business days to repair, with 4,976 repairs completed outside the five-business-day standard; simple urban faults accounted for 2,873 of these overdue repairs. However, these results should be considered in the context of the significant effort to reduce the backlog of outstanding repairs. Completing older backlog work contributed to the higher average repair times and means the annual result does not, on its own, reflect routine repair performance.

10. Monitoring, Evaluation and Compliance Strategy

Each year SA Power Networks prepares an annual [Monitoring, Evaluation and Compliance Strategy](#) (MECS).

SA Power Networks is required, under its electricity distribution licence, to comply with the South Australian EDC. Clause 2.6 of the EDC requires SA Power Networks to prepare an annual MECS in accordance with ESCOSA's Electricity Industry Guideline No. 1.

The MECS describes how SA Power Networks intends to meet the service standards specified in clauses 2.1 to 2.4 of the EDC.

The MECS supports SA Power Networks to maintain reliability and achieve EDC service standards by providing a structured framework for planning, monitoring, assessing and improving performance.

The MECS supports reliability outcomes by:

- Defining accountabilities and processes for monitoring EDC reliability measures, including USAIDIn, USAIFIn and customer restoration performance.
- Setting out data collection, validation and reporting arrangements to ensure performance results are accurate, timely and suitable for regulatory reporting.
- Monitoring performance against targets and reporting thresholds at distribution-system, feeder-category and regional levels, enabling emerging issues to be identified early.
- Requiring investigation of adverse performance, including analysis of interruption causes, weather impacts, equipment failures, restoration outcomes and any recurring or systemic issues.
- Linking performance findings to corrective action, including operational responses, maintenance activities, asset replacement, automation, vegetation management and reliability-improvement programs.
- Supporting escalation and governance, so material reliability risks and target breaches are visible to the appropriate operational and management forums.
- Documenting compliance activities and evidence, demonstrating how SA Power Networks has monitored performance, responded to risks and applied best endeavours to meet its EDC obligations.
- Driving continuous improvement, by using annual performance outcomes to refine reliability initiatives and prioritise future work programs.

In practice, the MECS complements the Reliability Management Plan (refer Section 10). The Reliability Management Plan identifies and delivers the operational and investment initiatives that improve reliability, while the MECS establishes how performance against the EDC standards is measured, reviewed, reported and used to trigger further action.

11. Reliability Improvements

SA Power Networks prepares a Reliability Management Plan each year to support the maintenance of reliability performance and achievement of the EDC reliability targets. The Plan identifies initiatives to maintain reliability and, where cost-effective, improve performance in response to the AERs STPIS. It also aims to minimise customer inconvenience and reliability-related GSL payments.

SA Power Networks' Reliability Operational Group supports this work by:

- reviewing interruptions daily to identify poor performance, recurring issues and potential systemic causes, and initiating remedial action where warranted; and
- developing and prioritising reliability-improvement projects.

Reliability improvement activities support two key outcomes: reducing the number of interruptions experienced by customers and improving field response and restoration times.

Reducing the number of customer interruptions

Key initiatives include:

- installing mid-line reclosers, sectionalisers and spur fuses to isolate faulted sections and reduce the number of customers affected by a fault;
- undertaking No Cause Found patrols following interruptions affecting more than 500 customers, to identify and address potential causes of future interruptions;
- undertaking patrols following switchgear reclose events affecting more than 1,000 customers, to identify potential defects or emerging fault risks;
- replacing lightning-damaged insulators in lightning-prone areas, including adjacent insulators where appropriate, with improved lightning-resistant insulators;
- removing, where feasible, trees associated with repeated interruptions;
- installing powerline covering in locations where tree limbs or debris are causing outages;
- delivering the Switched On While Switching campaign, reinforcing the importance of attention and procedural discipline during switching activities to reduce interruptions arising from switching errors; and
- delivering a targeted CBD cable replacement program during the 2025–30 regulatory control period.

Improving field response and restoration times

Key initiatives include:

- delivering Find the Cause training, tools and performance reporting for field crews;
- providing network-protection training;
- applying the Isolate and Restore Half First policy, which requires crews to isolate the affected network section and restore customers supplied by the unaffected section as soon as practicable; and
- promoting and monitoring Time to Arrive performance—the time taken for crews to arrive at an outage location and commence patrol activities. This supports analysis of both mobilisation and restoration performance and helps identify opportunities for further improvement.

Appendix A – Classifying Major Event Days

In accordance with Section 3.5 of IEEE 1366TM-2012, the following process—2.5 Beta Method—is used to identify Major Event Days (MED), provided that the natural log transformation of the data closely resembles a Gaussian (normal) distribution. Its purpose is to allow major events to be studied separately from daily operation, and in the process, to better reveal trends in daily operation that would be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events.

A MED is a day in which the daily system SAIDI exceeds a threshold value, T_{MED} . The SAIDI index is used as the basis of this definition since it leads to consistent results regardless of utility size and because SAIDI is a good indicator of operational and design stress. Even though SAIDI is used to determine the MEDs, all indices should be calculated based on removal of the identified days.

In calculating daily system SAIDI, any interruption that spans multiple days is accrued to the day on which the interruption begins.

The MED identification T_{MED} value is calculated at the end of each reporting period (typically one year) for use during the next reporting period, as follows:

- a) Collect values of daily SAIDI for five sequential years, ending on the last day of the last complete reporting period. If fewer than five years of historical data are available, use all available historical data until five years of historical data are available.
- b) Only those days that have a SAIDI/Day value will be used to calculate T_{MED} (do not include days that did not have any interruptions).
- c) Take the natural logarithm ($\ln$) of each daily SAIDI value in the data set.
- d) Find α (Alpha), the average of the logarithms (also known as the log-average) of the data set.
- e) Find β (Beta), the standard deviation of the logarithms (also known as the log-standard deviation) of the data set.
- f) Compute the MED threshold, T_{MED}

$$T_{MED} = e(\alpha + 2.5\beta)$$

- g) Any day with daily SAIDI greater than the threshold value T_{MED} that occurs during the subsequent reporting period is classified a major event day.

Activities that occur on days classified as major event days should be separately analysed and reported.